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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS 
SUBSIDIZING ENTERTAINMENT PROJECTS AS A STRATEGY FOR URBAN 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF MIAMI’S 
AMERICAN AIRLINES ARENA 
by 
Marcos Feldman 
Florida International University, 2005 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Guillermo Grenier, Major Professor 
This thesis evaluates the practice of subsidizing entertainment projects as 
economic development strategy through a case study of the American Airlines Arena 
(AAA). Subsidy proponents argued that it would generate new tax revenue and jobs, and 
enhance the city’s image and pride. This rationale neglects factors that mitigate the 
economic impact of arenas and fails to consider the social costs. The AAA subsidy is 
evaluated using a cost-benefit method that has been underutilized in academic research. 
The economic impact is analyzed by estimating the fiscal return on the public’s 
investment and the number and quality of new jobs created. The social costs are 
considered in light of Miami’s economic development history and the policy implications 
are discussed. The AAA subsidy results in hundreds of millions of dollars in losses over 
the term of the public-private partnership and created a negligible number of low quality 
jobs. Furthermore, the AAA subsidy may have exacerbated relations between residents 
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and leaders by prioritizing the leisure spending of visitors over the needs of inner city 
residents. 
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Chapter I 
Introduction 
Arenas and stadiums for professional sports teams have increasingly been 
financed with public dollars since the 1960’s, despite mounting taxpayer opposition to 
such public-private partnerships. It is has also become common for stadiums to be built in 
the central business districts of metropolitan areas in the United States. Facilities built in 
the first half of the 20th century were multi-purpose, serving two or more professional 
sports teams, and built to accommodate the grid-work and development of the city. These 
are increasingly being replaced by publicly financed, single-sport facilities that feature 
more luxury suites, up-scale dining, and other amenities that allow team owners to reap 
greater profits and provide multiple entertainment and consumption options for wealthy 
fans. Furthermore, in the context of deindustrialization, suburbanization and increasing 
socio-economic distress in urban areas, publicly funded sports facilities are increasingly 
promoted as urban economic development efforts that catalyze the revitalization of 
central city neighborhoods. Southeast Florida is a case in point for these trends.  
The Southeast Florida metropolitan area (Miami-Dade and Broward counties) has 
added at least three professional sports facilities in the past 20 years and all but one (Joe 
Robbie Stadium) were financed with public dollars that covered at least half of the total 
cost. In 2000, the Miami Heat abandoned their 11-year old publicly-financed Miami 
Arena for a new publicly financed arena built on prime, waterfront property just a few 
blocks away. The Florida Panthers abandoned the same old arena for their new publicly-
funded home in Broward County, just north of Miami-Dade. The Florida Marlins joined 
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the Miami Dolphins at Joe Robbie1 stadium following their inception in 1993, but have 
since lobbied for a new publicly funded stadium in a central city location. The moves of 
the Miami Heat and the Florida Panthers involved substantial cost sharing with the public 
and the present trajectory of the Marlins’ efforts may earn them a new ballpark financed 
with close to $200 million in public subsidies by 2009 (Marlins Ballpark, 2005).2    
Advocates of subsidies for sports facilities typically refer to economic impact 
analyses conducted by their research consultants that find that a new stadium or arena 
will generate hundreds of millions of dollars in new sales and tax revenue and create 
hundreds of new jobs (Pollack, 1998; Ryan, 2005; Sacramento Study, n.d.). Stadium 
subsidy advocates also argue that the non-economic benefits, such as heightened 
visibility as a “major league city” and enhanced civic pride serve to strengthen 
community ties and provide for a favorable investment climate (Baade, 1996, 2000; 
Johnson and Sack, 1996; Swindell and Rosentraub, 1998; Zimbalist, 2000). Non-
economic benefits are also thought of as goods in themselves, for which residents would 
be willing to sacrifice an increment of some economic benefit (Carlino and Coulson, 
2004; Johnson and Whitehead, 2000; Rappaport and Wilkerson, 2001). In Miami, local 
politicians and business leaders argued that building a new publicly financed arena for 
the Miami Heat would generate new jobs and revenue for the County, convert the bay-
                                                     
1 Joe Robbie stadium became Pro Player stadium in 1996 and was renamed Dolphins stadium in January of 
2005.  
 
2 In a recent memorandum to the Mayor of Miami-Dade County, the County Manager expressed that he is 
not optimistic that the project can be sufficiently funded and approved to break ground in 2009 (Burgess, 
2005). However, several county commissioners contributed to the memo and stated they would continue to 
seek a new publicly financed, domed stadium for the Marlins. 
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front property into an attractive recreational space, and enhance the pride and prestige of 
the city (Finefrock, 1996e; Robertson and Farrell, 1996).  
Independent scholarly research on the economic impacts of professional sports 
facilities suggests that publicly financed stadiums and arenas may not provide the 
economic benefits that their promoters contend they do (Austrian and Rosentraub, 2002; 
Baade, 1996, 1997, 2000; Coates and Humphreys, 1999; Hamilton and Kahn, 1997; 
Hudson, 1999; Miller, 2002; Noll and Zimbalist, 1997; Rappaport and Wilkerson, 2001; 
Rosentraub, 1994, 1997; Sanderson, 2000; Siegfried and Zimbalist, 2000; Swindell and 
Rosentraub, 1998; Zimbalist, 2000; Zimmerman, 1997). The rationales used to justify 
stadium and arena subsidy plans often neglect important principles in economic impact 
analysis, such as the substitution effect of fan spending (Chapin, 2002; Noll and 
Zimbalist, 1997; Siegfried and Zimbalist, 2000); the leakage of revenue outside the local 
economy (Baade, 2000; Howard and Crompton, 1995; Hudson, 2001; Siegfried and 
Zimbalist, 2000); and the opportunity cost of public investment (Chapin, 2002; Delaney 
and Eckstein, 2003; Eisinger, 2000; Hone, 2005; Hudson, 2001; Hunter, 1988; Noll and 
Zimbalist, 1997; Zimmerman, 1997). Further, the methodological challenges of 
measuring the intangible qualities of urban life, such as “civic pride” or the value of 
living in a “major league city,” make it difficult to capture the non-economic costs and 
benefits of publicly financed sports facilities (Alexander, Kern and Neills, 2000; Johnson 
and Sack, 1996; Pelissero, Henschen and Sidlow, 1991).  
As voters have become increasingly informed about the economic and non-
economic impacts of sports facilities, they have been more reluctant to support subsidy 
plans for new or existing sports facilities (Brown and Paul, 2002). Policy makers have 
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nonetheless devised and employed financing options that do not require voter 
referendums, public hearings or other mechanisms of accountability. To construct and 
operate Miami’s American Airlines Arena (AAA) local officials combined tax 
abatements, revenue from hotel and rental car (“transient”) taxes, prime waterfront 
property and investment in local infrastructure. In addition, promises of public park space 
and downtown beautification projects, and an expensive media campaign, were used to 
gain voter approval for the arena subsidy plan. But despite the hundreds of millions of 
dollars that came out of public coffers and press coverage of money wasted (Elmore, 
2004; Krischer-Goodman, 2001; Walker, 2000) and unjust labor practices (Bridges, 
1999; Stieghorst, 1999), to date no research has attempted to measure the public’s return 
on their investment in the AAA.  
This thesis analyzes the public’s return on their investment in the AAA by 
estimating the county’s share of arena profits over the term of the public-private 
partnership and the number and quality of new jobs created through increased visitor fan 
spending. Several academic studies have compared cities with and without publicly 
funded sports facilities or cities before and after acquiring such facilities, producing 
findings that suggest that publicly financed sports facilities do not significantly impact 
job or income growth in metropolitan areas. However, the comparative perspective of 
these studies does not allow for consideration of the contextually specific factors that 
limit or enhance the effectiveness of the “sports model” of urban economic development. 
This thesis employs a cost-benefit, case study approach to measure the costs and benefits 
of building and operating the AAA with public assistance by accounting for the 
geography of sports consumption and the political context of the decision to subsidize the 
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AAA in Miami. Moreover, this case study gauges the “real” value of the AAA by 
accounting for the substitution effect of fan spending, the leakage of arena revenue 
outside the economy and the opportunity cost of the public investment. The social and 
policy implications of subsidizing visitor entertainment are also considered in light of 
Miami’s history of economic development.   
Chapter II provides the historical context that is relevant for understanding the 
economic impact of publicly financed professional sports facilities. The trend in which 
stadiums and arenas for professional sports are increasingly built and operated with 
public assistance is described, including the increase in the pace and scale of construction 
and changes in the design and location of sports facilities. Factors in the professional 
sports industry that have contributed to the trends in stadium construction and finance are 
also reviewed, including the development of free agency and the monopoly structure of 
professional sports leagues. Finally, changes in urban governance that are related to the 
trend toward subsidized sports facilities are discussed. In particular, the strategies used by 
local leaders to build their cities through the acquisition of entertainment amenities, 
including professional sports facilities, are considered. Chapter III reviews the relevant 
literature on the impacts of professional sports facilities, considering both the economic 
and non-economic impacts of stadiums and arenas. Particular attention is paid to the basic 
principles of economic impact analysis, the findings of comparative research on the 
impact of sports facilities and the findings of research employing a cost-benefit approach. 
Chapter VI outlines the cost-benefit methodology used to analyze the economic impact of 
the American Airlines Arena, taking account of the geographic and commercial context 
of the AAA and the steps required to estimate the new revenue and jobs generated by the 
6 
 
new arena. Chapter V analyzes the economic impact of the AAA using a cost-benefit 
approach and presents the empirical findings, focusing on the balance of costs and 
benefits from the new arena and the number of full-time employment opportunities 
generated for local workers. Chapter VI considers the social and policy implications of 
this research in light of the past and present context of urban policy and stadium finance. 
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Chapter II 
Historical Context 
 
The Trend Toward Publicly Funded Sports Facilities.   
Totaling more than $20 billion in construction costs (Baade, 2003), professional 
sports stadiums and arenas over the last 30 years have been in the midst of what many 
have termed a “construction boom” (Coates and Humphreys, 2003; Kennedy and 
Rosentraub, 2000; Newsome and Comer, 2000). By 2002, more than 61 percent of the 
121 professional sports franchises were playing their home games in a facility built since 
1991 (Kennedy and Rosentraub, 2000, p. 436). Furthermore, sports arenas and stadiums 
are increasingly being erected in central city locations. These urban stadium locations 
may be prime downtown or waterfront property or inner city areas in need of economic 
revitalization. Newsome and Comer (2000) found that the suburbanization trend in 
stadium construction characteristic of the period from 1965 to 1985 had been reversed by 
1997, exhibiting “a downtown resurgence” that the authors found to be statistically 
significant.3  
Owners have sought to play in stadiums and arenas designed to generate higher 
profits. Siegfried and Zimbalist (2000) observe that from the perspective of team owners, 
the “inadequacy” of sports venues built before 1990 has little do with seating capacity, 
structural integrity or the quality of the view from the stands, but rather with the lack of 
luxury suites, catering facilities and advertising opportunities that generate increased cash 
flow from high-income fans (p. 89). Luxury amenities in new facilities dramatically 
                                                     
3 Newsome and Comer (2000) tested the significance of a perceived reversal of the trend to construct 
stadiums in the suburban locations in favor of central business districts and/or adjacent center city 
neighborhoods. The increase in stadium construction in these two areas relative to the declining preference 
for suburban locations was found to be statistically significant.  
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impact the bottom line of team owners since most luxury seats are not taxed by the 
leagues the way gate receipts are as part of the league’s efforts to redistribute profits and 
improve competitive balance (Baade, 2003). In 1987 Joe Robbie, owner of the Miami 
Dolphins, was able to parlay the revenue from luxury suites and personal seat licenses to 
secure funding for a new stadium independent of public assistance. Robbie’s innovative 
mining of these resources suggested the potential for sports stadiums and arenas to be 
privately financed.4  
Since 1987, however, the opposite has taken place in most cases. Municipal 
governments have increasingly become involved in the business of building and 
operating professional sports facilities. In 1950 National Basketball Association (NBA), 
National Football League (NFL) and Major League Baseball (MLB) stadia and arenas 
had public ownership rates of 46, 36 and 12 percent, respectively. At the same time no 
NHL facility was publicly owned. By contrast, in 1991 a minimum of 61 percent of the 
facilities in any of the professional sports leagues were owned by local governments 
(Coates and Humphreys, 2003, p. 16). The public’s share of the cost of new facilities has 
also increased. State and county shares of funding for new stadiums rose from 9 to 19 
percent and 30 to 45 percent, respectively, during the period from 1990 to 2005 
(projected) (Altshuler and Luberoff, 2003, p. 34). These subsidies can be direct, in the 
case of operating payments or land donations, but most often are indirect, in the form of 
tax exempt bonds, property tax exemptions, and other revenue foregone by the state or 
municipality (LeRoy and Hinkley, 2002).   
                                                     
4 The construction cost of Joe Robbie stadium was substantially less since it was built in a remote location, 
where property values were lower. Nonetheless, his financing strategy was a watershed in the industry.  
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In the face of greater public opposition to “corporate welfare,” the sources of 
subsidies have shifted away from general revenues. Local officials have turned to funding 
options that circumvent or appease taxpayer opposition, such as “sin” (tobacco and 
alcohol) and “transient” (hotel and rental car) taxes, tax exemptions, tax increment 
financing and other tax strategies (Altshuler and Luberoff, 2003). For example, the use of 
taxes on tobacco and alcohol to fund new sports facilities increased from 8 percent before 
1990 to 37 percent in the decade that followed (Long, 2002, table 4-30, qtd. in Altshuler 
and Luberoff, 2003, p. 34).  
 
Free Agency.  
At the same time as the public sector has become more involved in the financing 
of sports stadiums these facilities are increasingly being designed to maximize profits for 
franchise owners. The trend toward more profitable, publicly financed sports facilities in 
part corresponds to forces inside of the professional sports industry that have shaped the 
business of building stadiums and arenas (Baade, 2000; Noll and Zimbalist, 1997; 
Rosentraub, 1997; Bernstein, 1998; Baim, 1994). Comer and Newsome (2000) contend 
that “the reasons for [the] construction boom differ from earlier decades and reflect 
pressure from team owners and leagues for higher revenues which, ostensibly, can be 
repaid only through improved facilities” (p. 105-106).  
The development of unrestricted free agency, in which players have greater 
freedom to sell their talents to the highest bidder, has resulted in escalating player 
salaries, undermining the competitive ability of less wealthy teams (Rosentraub, 1997) 
and reducing competitive balance in North American sports leagues (Noll, 2002). The 
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National Basketball League’s (NBA) collective bargaining agreement in 1983 stipulated 
that players were guaranteed to receive up to 53 percent of league revenues (the “salary 
cap”) (NBPA History, 2005). When this labor agreement expired in 1987 a group of 
players brought an antitrust lawsuit against the team owners, which was settled through 
the Bridgeman Settlement Agreement, bringing unrestricted free agency to the NBA, the 
first league to adopt this policy (NBPA History, 2005). In addition to expanding the 
rights of professional athletes to sell their talents to the highest bidder, the Bridgeman 
Agreement shortened and limited the college draft, thus limiting the pool of young talent 
and increasing the bargaining power of established players (Rosentraub, 1997, p. 5-6, 
14). Through successive labor struggles, professional athletes have made additional gains 
for themselves. By 2001, players were entitled to up to 65 percent of revenues and by 
2004 total compensation for NBA players was $1.58 billion and the average salary 
surpassed $4 million, up from $300,000 in 1987 (NBPA History, 2005).  
The development of free agency has contributed to escalating player salaries, 
intense financial competition among teams and ultimately “accentuates an emulative 
tendency as it relates to the successful financial behavior and strategies of the most 
aggressive clubs in the various leagues” (Baade, 2003, p. 588). In their attempts to 
capture the most talented players, owners have sought to play in stadiums and arenas 
designed to generate higher profits. For awhile teams’ ability to appropriate an increasing 
percentage of revenue from sales at the stadium or arena helped them cover the cost of 
rising salaries (Rosentraub, 1997). However, the rate of salary increase was too steep and 
teams needed ever more sources of income to be able to afford top talent. Deals with 
cable companies and “superstations” were the solutions for the few teams in large media 
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markets; but for most, luxury suites and club seating together with expanded restaurants 
were the keys to financial success (Rosentraub, 1997, p. 5-6). These new strategies for 
generating greater income required that new facilities be built for new and existing teams 
across the country.  
 
The Sports Cartel.  
Team owners in the United States have been able to successfully demand new or 
renovated sports facilities as a result of the monopoly structure of the professional sports 
industry (Delaney and Eckstein, 2003; Euchner, 1993; Kennedy and Rosentraub, 2000; 
Shropshire, 1995). As cartels, leagues control the supply of teams and compel 
municipalities to engage in bidding wars to attract or retain professional teams, thereby 
maximizing the profits and advantage of the team owners that comprise the cartel 
(Kennedy and Rosentraub, 2000; Euchner, 1993).  
The merger of the former American Basketball Association (ABA) and the 
National Basketball Association (NBA) in 1976 consolidated the monopoly structure of 
professional basketball in the United States. Prior to this the ABA, which existed for ten 
years, was a fierce competitor for fans, players and venues with the NBA. The merger 
constrained the normal operations of the market for professional sports, including the 
entry of new players and teams in the league. Since then, the entry of new players in the 
league has been controlled through the NBA draft, in which the salaries for rookie 
players are set by a scale that is predetermined (until their contract expires and they 
become “free agents”). In each of the major professional sports in the United States 
member teams of the league determine collectively, as a committee, when and where a 
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new team may enter the league. Entry involves a substantial expansion fee to offset the 
cost to other league members of a reduction in average team revenue that results from 
adding a competitor for both advertising, merchandising, and championship potential 
(Noll, 2002). The monopoly structure of professional sports leagues has received 
protection from the federal court through the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961 (US Code, 
title 15, chapter 32). This act provided exemption to the leagues from antitrust laws 
governing the telecasting of sports. Specifically, leagues may enter into limited 
agreements with television networks in order to broadcast a “sports package” to viewers, 
forcing several TV networks to compete for one contract.5  
Kennedy and Rosentraub (2000) summarize the process resulting from the various 
protections of the monopoly over professional sports in the United States:  
 
The cartels, as one would expect, control the supply of franchises to maximize 
their profits and advantage. Each league seeks to ensure that there is at least one 
region (and perhaps two or three) that does not have a team. These regions 
become the “chasers,” pursuing existing teams with extremely generous 
incentive packages. They also chase the leagues themselves, describing the large 
incentive packages they will provide if they are granted an expansion franchise. 
Team owners and league officials share the contents of these offers with cities 
                                                     
5 Professional baseball and football have been specifically exempted from antitrust regulation. The Sports 
Broadcasting Act of 1961 singled out the National Football League for antitrust exemption (by essentially 
guaranteeing the league, rather than individual clubs, the right to negotiate broadcast agreements) and 
Major League Baseball’s was similarly protected from antitrust laws governing TV broadcasts in Baltimore 
Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Association in 1986 (U.S. 805 F.2d 663). More important 
for Major League Baseball, however, was the decision in Federal Baseball Club v. National League in 1922 
(259 U.S. 200), in which baseball leagues were ruled to be exempt from antitrust laws established under the 
Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890. The court found that baseball was a state affair, not interstate commerce, 
and therefore should be protected from competition on the open market. The decision was reaffirmed in 
1952 (Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356) and 1972 (Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258). 
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that currently host teams in an effort to generate counteroffers and increases in 
the size of existing incentive packages. (439)  
 
This industry structure allows team owners substantial leverage over cities and their 
public officials through threats to relocate to another city or in the bidding wars that cities 
engage in to attract a team. Team owners have taken advantage of the insulation from 
market forces to pressure municipalities into meeting their demands (Delaney and 
Eckstein, 2003; Shropshire, 1995). The increasing incidence and proportion of public 
assistance provided by state and local governments for the construction and operation of 
professional sports facilities was noted above. Thus far San Francisco, and to a lesser 
degree Los Angeles, are the only cities in which the opposition has been able to resist the 
will of proponents to build the city through the sports model (Keating, 1999; DeLeon, 
1992).6 But while stadium subsidies have proliferated in the United States they have been 
rare in Europe (Noll, 2002). A brief overview of the contrasting structure of sports in 
Europe, particularly professional football (soccer) leagues, sheds additional light on the 
                                                     
6 The San Francisco Giants had sought a new baseball stadium since 1981 but proponents of a new publicly 
financed stadium for the Giants lost ballot initiatives in 1987 and 1989. Only in 1996, when proponents 
guaranteed voters that no direct public subsidies would be provided, was a new stadium for the Giants (now 
Pac Bell Park) publicly approved to be built in the China Basin (Agostini, Quigley and Smolensky, 1997). 
However, Long (2005) finds found that subsidies were subsequently provided through publicly financed 
infrastructure improvements in the surrounding area. Altshuler and Luberoff (2003) note that in San 
Francisco local officials, who “learned to segregate the public and private roles so deftly” (p. 242), were 
able to assemble public lands, provide low-interest loans, infrastructure improvements and tax abatements. 
But in the end Pac Bell Park received a relatively small public subsidy and voters twice successfully 
rejected previous plans that involved larger subsidies. A similar scenario unfolded in Los Angeles, where a 
coalition of community-based organizations was able to resist and shape the plans of arena subsidy 
proponents. While the Staples Center, home to three major league teams, was built with public funds, 
community-based organizations secured a Community Benefits Agreement (CBA) from the developer. The 
CBA stipulated that in exchange for the community’s support for the arena plans, the developer must 
provide the community with social and economic benefits (good jobs for local workers, child care facilities 
and programs, and more) (LeRoy and Aparicio, 2002). Thus, San Francisco and L.A. represent cases of 
successful grassroots resistance insomuch as plans to build new publicly financed were significantly 
modified by the will of voters and community organizations and residents.    
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relevance of the structure of sports leagues for the political and economic calculations 
involved in subsidizing sports facilities.  
European football leagues have for many decades operated under a system of 
promotion and relegation, as compared to the single “major league” structure of North 
American professional sports. The promotion/relegation (PR) system features a national 
football league organized as a hierarchy of “divisions” in which the most successful 
teams (in terms of win-loss ratio) are promoted to higher divisions while the worst 
performing teams are relegated to divisions below. Division size is regulated by 
maintaining or changing the number of teams allowed to be promoted or relegated each 
year. In addition to entering a new division by means of competitive merit, cities in 
which market demand for sport grows enough to support a new team financially (i.e., 
afford the costs of a playing facility, personnel wages, etc.) may acquire one and enter 
competition at the lowest division without paying an “expansion fee” to the governing 
body that oversees all the divisions in the national football league. Moreover, in 
European football, there are several national and international tournaments, such as 
England’s F.A. Cup (and many other such “domestic cups”), in which clubs from lower 
league divisions may qualify and win; the UEFA Cup, which admits the 5th to 8th place 
teams in most European football leagues and the UEFA Champions League, which 
admits the best 4 teams from most European leagues.  
Fort (2000) has noted that the similarities between the organization of sports in 
Europe and the United States may outweigh the technical differences. Indeed, a number 
of researchers agree that both European and North American sports leagues operate as 
monopolies (Fort, 2000; Andreff and Staudohar, 2000); or they find that an important 
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difference between the structure of the leagues is a matter of the degree to which the 
sports market is monopolized (Noll, 1998, 2003). However, of relevance to this analysis 
is the fact that while both clubs in Europe and the United States are compelled to reap 
large profits to keep pace with increasing player salaries,7 in the former context subsidies 
for sports facilities are rare while in the latter they are common.   
Plainly stated, the PR system, by exposing leagues to market competition 
nationally among cities, makes city officials less vulnerable to the demands of team 
owners. Football clubs exist in virtually every European city large enough to support one, 
thereby providing a home team sports product almost everywhere where there is demand 
(Noll, 1998). Not only is there little or no untapped demand for team owners to exploit 
but the greater historical relationship between individual teams and their fans precludes 
the possibility of abandoning one fan base for another for financial reasons (Baade, 
2003). By contrast, American sports leagues have placed strict constraints on league 
expansion to maintain excessive demand, thereby establishing a “stadium game” in which 
a new or relocating team will go the highest bidder among cities.  
However, the developments in the sports industry only partly explain the 
increasing public sector involvement in professional sports and the facilities where they 
are showcased. Changes in the way cities are being built and governed also shape 
municipalities’ decisions to enter into business partnerships with sports team owners.   
 
 
 
                                                     
7 Free agency in European football was established in the Bosman case in 1995 which had an immediate 
positive impact on player salaries (Noll, 1998).  
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Urban Governance and Economic Development.  
 
I feel like a Roman Emperor.  I can’t give decent city services, I want to close 
[city] health centers, and I want to cut back on library hours, and here I am 
giving bread and circuses to the people.8  
 
The statement of the Mayor of Philadelphia in 1993 exemplifies the recent 
strategic shift in city governance in the United States. During the rapid urbanization of 
the late 19th and early 20th century the “great task of American municipal governments 
was to manage the politics of city building for a burgeoning populace by providing the 
public services essential to health, safety, and civic education” (Eisinger, 2000, p. 316). A 
century later, cities are being built as “places to play” (Judd and Fainstein, 1999) through 
the construction of costly entertainment amenities, often in partnership with private 
investors (Altshuler and Luberoff, 2003; Eisinger, 2000).  
Deindustrialization and national economic restructuring throughout the post-
World War II period has altered the way downtown and inner city areas are being 
planned and developed (Altshuler and Luberoff, 2003; Eisinger, 2000, 1988). As the 
manufacturing-based economy abandoned its traditional home in Northeast and Midwest 
cities of the United States in the latter half of the 20th century, the residential population 
of central cities eroded along with the urban tax base and public expenditures, 
contributing to increasing social and economic distress (Eisinger, 2000; Wilson, 1996). In 
their attempt to stem suburbanization and the steep decline in the vitality of central cities, 
                                                     
8 This statement was given by Philadelphia Mayor Edward Rendell on the inaugural occasion of the 
Pennsylvania Convention Center, 1993 (qtd. in Bissinger, 1997, p. 202).   
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public officials shifted from a “managerial” to an “entrepreneurial” form of governance 
(Eisinger, 1988; Harvey, 1989; Nichols-Clark, Lloyd, Wong and Jain, 2003). The 
development of the city through the enticement of private capital became the bipartisan 
mandate of local leaders (Eisinger, 2000, 1988). Hotels and convention centers are like 
municipal cash registers;9 virtually their entire occupancy is comprised of visitors from 
out-of-town who stay overnight and pay considerable room taxes. Further, visitors are 
more likely than local consumers to spend on food, retail and entertainment, thus 
importing sales and tax revenue (Petersen, 1996). Promotional studies of proposed visitor 
amenities almost always project substantial increases in visitor attendance and subsequent 
impacts from the ripple effects of new spending (Howard and Crompton, 1995). 
Moreover, downtown redevelopment involves infrastructure improvements designed to 
provide visitors with easy access to the central city by way of well lit, aesthetically 
enhanced corridors, masking the dilapidated conditions of nearby communities and thus 
the social contradictions inherent in such redevelopment (Friedman, Andrews and Silk, 
2004). Some observers have characterized this process as a shift away from developing 
cities to accommodate the needs of local residents toward planning and development that 
covets the “visitor class” (Eisinger, 2000; Judd and Fainstein, 1999; Friedman, Andrews 
and Silk, 2004).    
In many urban areas professional sports facilities have played an important part in 
this process as catalysts for the cultural and economic revitalization of inner city 
neighborhoods (Altshuler and Luberoff, 2003; Eisinger, 2000; Judd and Fainstein, 1999; 
                                                     
9 A study by Los Angeles Alliance for a New Economy (LAANE) and The Center for Labor Research and 
Education at UCLA (1999) found that hotels and convention centers generate considerable net revenues for 
municipalities even when underutilized because of the various taxies levied on them and the fact that most 
of the revenue they generate from sales represents a rise in exports (p. 58, 82).  
18 
 
Noll and Zimbalist, 1997). The use of sport in the entrepreneurial strategy of urban 
development has been widely documented (Curry, Schwirian and Woldoff, 2004; 
Delaney and Eckstein, 2003; Fort, 2003; Rich, 2000; Noll and Zimbalist, 1997; 
Shropshire, 1995; Euchner, 1993; Pelissero, Henschen and Sidlow, 1991). Previously in 
this section, I noted the increased pace and magnitude of public expenditures on sports 
facilities, as well as the tendency toward building such facilities in or near the central 
business districts of American cities. Ironically, while prior to 1970, 71 percent of cities 
that built sports facilities were growing rapidly, since then only 57 percent are growing 
(Eisinger, 2000). Moreover, of the 30 cities that publicly funded new sports facilities 
since 1970, twenty six experienced a considerable increase of people living in 
neighborhoods with poverty rates greater than or equal to 40 percent (Eisinger, 2000, p. 
321). While this is to be expected given the nature of urban socio-economic decline 
during that period, it is remarkable that such publicly funded projects, designed and built 
to accommodate “the visitor class,” continue to be politically feasible in the midst of 
increasing urban inequality.  
 
Local Politics.   
Developments in the professional sports industry and the changes in urban 
governance have shaped the politics of sports subsidies at the local level. A growing body 
of research argues that local actors coalesce around stadium subsidy proposals to achieve 
their individual goals, which may overlap, diverge or be completely disconnected 
(Delaney and Eckstein, 2004; Curry, Schwirian and Woldoff, 2003; Foreman, 2003; 
Keating, 1997; Pelissero, Henschen and Sidlow, 1991). This research also finds that the 
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prevailing socio-political and economic context of the city modifies the interests and 
actions of influential local players related to professional sports facilities (Delaney and 
Eckstein, 2004; Curry, Schwirian and Woldoff, 2003; Foreman, 2003). In particular, 
demographic changes, cultural norms and traditions in political and civic life, the 
economic vitality of the city and the relative strength of the urban power structure are 
thought to shape the outcome of the struggle over building private stadiums with public 
dollars (Delaney and Eckstein, 2004; Curry, Schwirian and Woldoff, 2003). While it is 
beyond the scope of this thesis to review this literature, it is useful to briefly consider the 
local politics in which the decision to subsidize the AAA was embedded.  
Like Denver, San Diego and Phoenix, cities that have recently built professional 
sports facilities with public dollars, since World War II, Miami has had a growing 
economy with a burgeoning population. From 1960 to 2000 the total population grew by 
144 percent, slowing from 36 percent in the decade prior to 1970 to 16 percent between 
1990 and 2000 (Census Scope, 2005). Also like its western “sunbelt” counterparts, 
Miami’s urban power structure had been relatively weak throughout the 1950’s and 60’s, 
suffering from a fragmented organization. Stepick, Grenier, Castro and Dunn (2003) 
noted that the business leadership in these decades “seemingly came from everywhere 
else, with few elites having deep roots in South Florida” (p. 37). Appalled at the 
ineffectiveness of local leadership, Alvah Chapman, an executive at Knight-Ridder, a 
local media giant, set out to transform the Greater Miami Chamber of Commerce. The 
chamber’s ranks swelled from 750 members in 1984 to over 4000 by the year 2000. 
Chapman also secretly organized the Non-Group, an unofficial grouping of executive 
officers from the city’s largest companies (Stepick et al., 2003, p. 36-7).  
20 
 
Among the numerous central city development projects accomplished through the 
integrated efforts of the local political and business elites was a light rail system; a 
waterfront shopping and entertainment center known as Bayside Marketplace; the Miami 
Heat’s former home, the Miami Arena and its more recent replacement, the American 
Airlines Arena; a new high-rise government center and a new main library, historical 
museum and fine arts center just across the street (Stepick et al., 2003). More recently a 
costly Performing Arts Center has been under construction for over a year and the Miami 
21 plan, featuring plans for intensified downtown and regional economic development, 
was unveiled. Indeed, Miami is in the early stages of the gentrification of its historical 
central city communities and already in the midst of considerable high-rise condo and 
commercial development near the central business district. While the local urban power 
structure was still fragmented and weak in the 1960’s, of late it seems to have become 
more organized, coherent, and inexorable in its ambitions. The construction and operation 
of the American Airlines Arena with public subsidies, which was made possible by 
cooperation between Miami’s white and Latino business elites, represents a case in point.   
The inspiration behind the plan for a new arena for the Miami Heat was the desire 
to make more money and subsequently purchase more expensive basketball talent. The 
statements of Jay Cross and other team spokespersons indicate that the Miami Heat 
sought to avoid additional financial losses at the Miami Arena (Talalay, 1999). The 
former arena’s “cozy” design undermined the team’s ability to compete economically in 
the context of league-wide trends toward more profitable sports facilities (DeFede, 1996). 
With only 16 luxury suites and a capacity of about 15,000, some observers 
retrospectively commented that the arena was obsolete from the time it opened (Brady, 
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1996; DeFede, 1996). According to Robert Franklin, general manager of the AAA’s 
concessionaire’s in 2000, “the new arena was built and contemplated so the team doesn't 
have to share revenue with the landlord or management company… [and] it was designed 
and built with the intention of maximizing revenue for the team” (Krischer-Goodman, 
1999, p. 2).  When Micky Arison took over the team from his father Ted in 1995, he said 
he would not renew his lease and sought a public subsidy to build a new facility from 
which he could generate enough revenue to field a more competitive team (Foreman, 
2003).  
Bicentennial Park, located near the Miami Seaport and overlooking the bay, 
emerged as the primary site of interest for a new facility for the Miami Heat (Tanfani, 
1996).  As owner of Carnival Cruise Lines, Arison had an interest in the Port from which 
his luxury ships departed for various vacation spots in the Caribbean. Director of the 
Seaport and an important player in local business and political relations, Carmen Lunetta, 
was aggressively seeking expansion of the port and had a natural interest in placing the 
new arena at the Bicentennial Park location as it was expected to boost bay-front business 
and tourism (Foreman, 2003). Miami-Dade officials refused to consider the possibility of 
a bay-front arena but Micky Arison used subtle threats of moving his basketball franchise 
and cruise ships to Broward County “to awaken Miami-Dade’s civic and political 
community about the stakes of the game” (Foreman, 2003, p. 102).   
 County commissioners could vote to approve a subsidy for a new arena but 
eventually had to enlist an outsider, a member of the civic community, to broker the deal 
between the team and the county. Early in 1996 county officials asked Anthony Ridder, 
owner of The Miami Herald newspaper and member of the elite Non-Group, to facilitate 
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the deal with Arison (Foreman, 2003). Soon after, in an emergency meeting in March 
1996, Miami-Dade commissioners approved an arena subsidy proposal in the face of 
internal dissent (Dade County BOCC, 1996). Among the dissenting commissioners was 
Alex Penelas, who argued that the county assumed too great a financial risk in the 
proposed plan and was also opposed to the use of scarce public land on the waterfront for 
a new arena. The prevailing structure of county authority, in which a majority of 
commissioners could approve a resolution in the face of minority dissent, ensured that the 
plan could not be blocked (Foreman, 2003). However, this structure would soon be 
transformed.  
 The subsidy plan approved by commissioners in March of 1996 was challenged 
by an opposition group referendum, led by local attorney Dan Paul, who gained enough 
signatures to place the issue on the ballot for November of that year (Finefrock, 1996e). 
In the same year as the decision over the fate of a new facility for the Miami Heat arose, 
the structure of Miami-Dade government changed, centralizing authority with the 
addition of the position of executive mayor (Foreman, 2003). The referendum campaign 
coincided with the campaign for Miami-Dade’s first executive mayor and Alex Penelas 
took advantage of the arena subsidy issue in his mayoral campaign. A large part of his 
campaign was built around opposition to the Ridder subsidy plan (Finefrock, 1996b). 
Penelas was elected a month before citizens would vote on the new arena in an election 
characterized by ethnic rather than partisan solidarity among voters (Hill, Moreno and 
Cue, 2001).  
The ethnic connection would also prove useful a few months later when Penelas 
would reverse his previous position as he pledged his support to the arena subsidy 
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proponents following his successful bid to be the executive mayor (Foreman, 2003).10 
After his mayoral victory in Miami, Penelas began working behind the scenes to structure 
a new deal with Arison and the Heat. Penelas called upon trusted associates in the civic 
community to re-work the deal with Arison through the mediation of Anthony Ridder 
(Foreman, 2003). The original Ridder plan drawn up prior to Penelas’ involvement called 
for the county to invest a total of $253 million in direct subsidies, including a hotel bed 
tax, state funds for port improvements, a state sales tax rebate to fund arena construction 
and a substantial cost for infrastructure improvements (Dade county BOCC, 1996). The 
Ridder plan had a very limited revenue sharing stipulation with the county while forcing 
the county to assume the risk of cost overruns during the construction phase (Dade 
county BOCC, 1996). The plan re-worked by Penelas significantly changed the 
arrangements such that the total amount of direct and indirect subsidies was slightly 
higher, with the state and the city contributing a larger share, but the construction of the 
arena (and any cost overruns) would be financed by the team (Related Agreements, 1997; 
Talalay, 1999).  
But the plan did not sell itself. Less than two weeks before the referendum, a 
Herald-NBC 6 poll reported that 48 percent of residents opposed the subsidy proposal for 
the AAA, with only 36 percent in support (Finefrock, 1996d). Mayor Penelas and the 
arena subsidy proponents faced the task of persuading a large number of voters to reverse 
                                                     
10 The exploitation of critical elements of community solidarity by politicians seeking to harness public 
dollars for sports stadiums is not uncommon. While in Miami the cohesive element was the politics of 
ethnicity, in Phoenix local politician Jan Brewer played to the anti-tax philosophy of the local elderly 
population to win a political election. Once elected to the county board of supervisors, Brewer flipped sides 
and joined the corporate-based stadium proponents who sought to raise taxes to fund a new facility for an 
expansion professional baseball team (Delaney and Eckstein, 2003, p. 125). She subsequently used her 
established connection with the public to help the stadium proponents achieve their goals.   
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their position on the arena subsidy issue, a position which was probably reinforced by the 
anti-subsidy message in Penelas’ recent mayoral campaign. The ballot initiative was 
worded such that a “no” meant yes to the new arena; it asked voters whether they were 
opposed to a new publicly funded arena and whether they opposed a new facility to be 
built on the waterfront (Finefrock, 1996a). Observers from the local press noted that the 
inclusion of two separate negatively worded questions may have confused voters 
(Finefrock, 1996a; Nielsen, 2000). Ultimately, county voters rejected the initiative 
against the arena by 59 to 41 percent, with the bulk of the opposition to the new arena 
coming from neighborhoods that were predominantly non-Hispanic Whites.11 This 
suggests that the strongest support for the Penelas plan for County subsidies to the arena 
came mostly from ethnic and racial minorities. While the charismatic mayor was a 
critical factor in selling the new plan to voters (Foreman, 2003), the role played by a 
marketing consultant has been overlooked. It has been acknowledged that arena 
proponents spent $3.7 million on the campaign compared to the opposition’s 
approximately $70,000 (Foreman, 2003; Ostrowski, 1999), but the strategic knowledge 
provided by the county’s marketing consultant was a valuable contribution to the arena 
subsidy campaign. A Hill Research poll revealed key aspects of the ethnic solidarity in 
Miami as well as shed light on the social value of the team to local residents. 
 
Cuban-Americans saw the arena as a symbol of pride and local achievement. 
African-Americans saw an economic project bringing new jobs and had pride in 
the local NBA team. White voters were most excited about a new family-
                                                     
11 While a majority of voters in neighborhoods that were predominantly non-Hispanic white rejected the 
opposition initiative as well (54 percent), the proportion was substantially less than for neighborhoods 
inhabited primarily by non-Hispanic blacks (66 percent) or Hispanics (68 percent) (Finefrock, 1996c).  
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friendly park on Miami’s waterfront, including soccer fields and a new arena, 
which would bring in concerts and other entertainment events. Recasting the 
arena as a waterfront park and arena was to be key to our campaign. (Murphy 
2004, p. 2) 
 
In addition to targeting the relevant ethnic and racial markets in Miami-Dade, the 
strategic campaign developed by the consultants made effective use of the support of 
Alex Penelas, the popular Miami Heat coach Pat Riley, and other athletes and celebrities 
(Finefrock, 1996c; Murphy, 2004).  
More critical observers attribute the success of the Penelas plan to “rhetorical 
banana peels” (Nielsen, 2000), including the wording of the ballot question as well as the 
various “ideas” about other amenities that were to be included on the arena property. The 
arena proponents’ campaign, broadcast on television and in the local print media, 
featured three-dimensional computer renderings prepared by Cooper-Robertson, the 
county’s consultants, of a proposed soccer field, a public park and plaza, and a pedestrian 
bridge (Jimenez, 2000; Nielsen, 2000). Dan Paul asserted that the arena proponents 
“seduced the public with grand plans that they never had any intention [of] building” 
(Jimenez, 2000, para. 2). Presently one restaurant sits on a portion of the site where in the 
proponents campaign a soccer field and public space was proposed to be developed. The 
rest of the undeveloped land facing the bay is empty, where recently a few construction 
vehicles could be seen leveling the land in preparation of some development.12  
                                                     
12 Like the political exploitation of community values, the use of “fantasy documents,” which present 
seemingly neutral and objective assessments of a project and mask underlying individual or organizational 
interests (Clark, 1999), is widespread in the politics of stadium subsidies. In Denver similar three-
dimensional computer renderings of the future of the community that would host Coors Field featured a 
pedestrian overpass, residential housing, an international shopping district and a number of landscaping 
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The opposition to the subsidy plan in Miami was relatively weak, led by local 
attorney Dan Paul and his coalition of mostly environmental activists, including a handful 
of local intellectuals (Talalay, 1999). The initial details of the Penelas plan and the 
strength of the pro-arena coalition were developed in secret, thereby giving opponents a 
late start in developing their campaign strategy. Foreman (2003) points out that while 
opposition movements on other political issues in the 1990’s tapped into local ethnic and 
racial minority bases, Paul’s was mainly a “paper” coalition and as mentioned previously, 
had far less campaign funds than the arena proponents (p. 214). Although significant 
dissent existed within the county commission, the changed political structure acted as a 
“containment mechanism” against these internal forces (Foreman 2003, p. 214; Dade 
County BOCC, 1996).  
In addition, the presence of a relatively strong urban power structure meant the 
opposition would have to be formidable to resist the will of the arena proponents. While 
the effectiveness of the traditional Anglo elite to influence local politics had been 
weakened or at least modified by the growing influence of Latino political and business 
leaders (Stepick et al., 2003), its connections were still needed and called upon in the 
collaborative effort to build the AAA (Foreman, 2003). Foreman (2003) argues that it 
was the interaction of various circumstances that determined the outcome of the arena 
subsidy decision in Miami and the shape that the arrangements between the team and the 
county took.  
 
                                                                                                                                                              
projects (Delaney and Eckstein, 2003). Like Miami, Denver’s utopian visions of a vibrant stadium 
community never materialized. 
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The modified formal political structure coupled with the looming referendum 
produced the change in public policy. Alex Penelas, the new county executive 
mayor […] used his electoral mandate and a team of trusted negotiators to 
rework the subsidy plan with the Heat, and then sell it to voters to defeat the 
opposition referendum in November and clear the way for a new arena to be 
built. (Foreman, p. 102)   
 
Moreover, “the difference between how the Ridder plan was negotiated and the 
reworking of the Penelas plan reflects changing patterns of influence in Miami-Dade 
policy making” (Foreman, p. 131). The growth in the power and visibility of Latin- and 
Cuban-American political and civic players (Stepick et al., 2004; Warren and Moreno, 
2003) meant that Arison had to form a coalition with the new Hispanic leadership in 
addition to the traditional Non-Group elites to gain support from the growing Hispanic 
constituency (Foreman, 2003).  
This brief history illustrates how despite the nuances introduced by the context of 
ethnic politics and changed formal government structure at the local level, the case of 
Miami is shaped by the broader forces in urban governance and the professional sports 
industry that have compelled municipalities to support new professional sports facilities. 
This review of the Miami case is not sufficient to draw any strict conclusions, but it 
reveals some important continuities with broader trends related to the sports industry and 
urban governance.  
The details of the AAA’s financial arrangements revealed in the following 
chapters illustrate how the Miami Heat’s new arena is fairly typical of the trend toward 
replacing economically obsolete stadiums and arenas with new downtown facilities 
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designed to capture more spending and generate greater profits for team owners and 
players. The pressure of escalating player salaries stemming from the sports industry was 
clearly felt by Arison and the Heat at their former arena in Overtown. While the 
bargaining leverage of the league cartel was not as relevant in this case since the Heat 
were not an expansion team in 2000, the competition between Broward and Miami to 
host the team in part reflects the anxiety of public officials over losing (or gaining) a 
sports franchise and consequently receiving a blow to the city’s “major league” status 
(and consequently a decline in tourists). The case of the AAA is also representative of the 
trend toward building the city for the visitor class, although Miami appears to still be in 
the early stages of its urban renaissance (Dluhy, Revell and Wong, 2002).  
Most important, however, for the economic impact of the AAA, was the 
abruptness of the decision to build and operate it with public funds. While in 
Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Minneapolis, Cleveland and Baltimore it took local leaders 
almost a decade to achieve their stadium ambitions, the plan to build the AAA was 
finalized only two years after Arison’s demands and the project was completed less than 
three years after that. The rushed negotiations contributed to the resulting finance 
structure that benefits the team’s owners and players at the expense of local taxpayers. In 
addition, the arena was built as one of the first large entertainment amenities in the 
northern part of the central business district and thus was not integrated into an existing 
commercial and architectural fabric which would enhance its ability to generate spending 
from visitors.  As noted, the opposition in Miami was weak and the urban power structure 
was able to quickly and secretly coalesce and garner taxpayer support to divert scarce 
public resources toward an expensive entertainment project with little in the way of 
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planning and accountability. Particularly in this last sense, the case of Miami mirrors the 
experiences of many cities across the United States. The implications for the public 
interest at the local level are daunting. The next chapter reviews the literature that has 
analyzed the impacts that these decisions have had on local communities. 
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Chapter III 
Literature Review 
 
Chapin’s (2002) typology distinguishes between the economic and non-economic 
effects of subsidized sports facilities. Non-economic impacts of sports stadiums are 
manifest in the political and social realm when a franchise alters a city’s image (Chapin, 
2002, 2004; Rosentraub, 1997), sense of civic pride (Hone, 2005; Rosentraub, 1997), the 
fabric of everyday social interactions (Eisinger, 2000; Rappaport and Wilkerson, 2001; 
Riess, 2000) and the dynamics of local political relationships in the struggle over stadium 
financing (Curry, Schwirian, and Woldoff, 2004; Delaney and Eckstein, 2003). Economic 
impacts may in part be consequences of non-economic impacts, but the former are 
measured as local and/or regional economic changes in the number and quality of jobs, in 
income, property values and other indicators of economic development (Baade, 2003; 
Noll and Zimbalist, 1997; Rappaport and Wilkerson, 2001; Rich, 2000). If the perception 
of an improved “investment climate” leads to economic growth then this is an example of 
a non-economic impact translating into economic impacts.  
Regarding Miami’s American Airlines Arena, this analysis quantifies its present 
“value” to the public using a cost-benefit approach that measures the difference between 
the total subsidy provided for the construction and operation of the American Airlines 
Arena and the total economic benefit that is generated for local taxpayers. This chapter 
reviews the different approaches that have been used to measure the economic impact of 
publicly financed sports facilities. While the use of the “social benefits” rationale by 
stadium proponents will be considered in the final chapter as a political issue, the 
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scholarly research that has attempted to measure the non-economic impacts of 
professional sports facilities deserves mention in this chapter.  
 
The Non-Economic Impacts of Professional Sports Facilities 
According to Chapin (2002), non-economic benefits may not only be large 
enough to tip the cost-benefit balance toward a positive assessment of stadium building, 
but cities “routinely invest in projects that are not economically viable,” such as concert 
halls, museums and open park and recreational space in urban areas (p. 8). While these 
alternatives do not tend to generate large profits for rich team owners and players, they 
nonetheless represent substantial public investments toward the consumption of cultural 
and recreational activities that are supposed to make us happy. Still there are other 
reasons to consider non-economic impacts.  
Proponents have traditionally justified public expenditures for stadiums on 
economic grounds (Crompton, 2001). But the recent body of research that has eroded that 
rationale has forced stadium proponents to increasingly emphasize the non-economic 
impacts of attracting or retaining a professional sports team. Curry, Schwirian, and 
Woldoff (2004) observe that proponents often frame their campaign to finance a new 
sports facility in terms of urban economic revitalization but later supplant this argument 
with “warnings” that if a franchise is not successfully retained or attracted, the city may 
lose or fail to gain “major league” status and prestige. Christopher Flores of Sports 
Illustrated wrote of the Los Angeles Rams moving to St. Louis, “Without them, we’re a 
cow town” (March 13, 1995). This framing of the issue emphasizes the benefits to an 
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area’s image and sense of civic pride. However, it is unclear how and to what extent the 
presence of professional sports impacts local residents in these non-economic ways.  
When economists try to gauge the social benefits of the presence of sports teams 
they couch their discussion in terms of “quality-of-life” measurements. An individuals’ 
quality of life is positively impacted by a sports team if the presence of the team enhances 
their happiness and satisfaction with their living environment. Having a common topic of 
conversation with other city residents or having access to the travails of the local pro 
sports team through television programming are two ways in which a team may enhance 
satisfaction (Rappaport and Wilkerson, 2001; Zimmerman, 1997). These and other 
similar benefits are essentially consumption benefits and to the extent that residents 
consume sports entertainment they may receive substantial benefits.  
However, unlike a sunny day or an old-growth forest that provides benefits by its 
mere existence, sports entertainment is mostly a private consumption benefit that is 
contingent upon certain forms of access (Zimmerman, 1997). To the extent that enjoying 
professional sporting events requires expenses related to admissions, parking, or cable 
television, a considerable number of local residents are automatically excluded. The 
greatest consumption benefits are most likely extracted from luxury suites at stadiums, an 
exclusive privilege of an urban area’s business elite and celebrity class. Making the issue 
of equity the focus of their research, Siegfried and Peterson (2000) find that the vast 
majority of spectators attending a typical urban sports event are middle- to upper-class 
and live outside the environs of the stadium.  
Nevertheless, economists have developed several approaches for gauging 
“quality-of-life” benefits. Starting from the most quantitative approach, a “valuation” or 
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“consumer surplus” method contends that the amount of money a fan or resident is 
willing to spend above and beyond the actual value of a product represents the quality-of-
life benefit to that individual of consuming sports entertainment (Alexander, Kern and 
Neill, 2000; Irani, 1997). For example, if survey research reveals that on average fans 
would be willing to pay $25 for an admission ticket that only costs $20, they receive a $5 
benefit by attending the game at the lower ticket price. A different approach attempts to 
gauge what residents are implicitly willing to pay for a team by merely living in a certain 
city. In this case, if residents are willing to incur higher housing costs or lower wages to 
live in a “major league” city, the difference in these values compared to that of other 
cities is the implicit benefit they receive from the amenities of that city that make it 
“worth it” to live there (Johnson and Whitehead, 2000; Gyourko and Tracy, 1991; 
Blomquist, Berger, and Hoehn, 1988; Roback, 1982). Rappaport and Wilkerson (2001) 
have also argued that the success of cities in attracting replacement sports franchises may 
be evidence of their willingness to pay for professional sports and therefore the size of 
such outlays relative to other cities provides an indicator of the magnitude of the social 
benefit they receive from the team’s presence.  
The assumptions of Rappaport and Wilkerson and others are problematic, 
however, for several reasons. First, stadiums and franchises are being subsidized in the 
face of voter disapproval all over the country (Brown and Paul, 2002; Eisinger, 2000; 
Fort, 2003), suggesting that widespread “willingness-to-pay” is not the norm. It is equally 
problematic to attribute too large (if any) a proportion of a city’s image or civic pride to 
its professional sports franchise, particularly if the city has beaches, warm weather, and 
other attractive features to offer. The argument that migrants are willing to incur higher 
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costs or lower incomes simply because these are the circumstances that result from their 
actions neglects a fundamental requirement for causality. The relationship between two 
factors must be nonspurious; that is, their relationship cannot be explained in terms of a 
third factor in order to be causal (Babbie, 2002, p. 86). Moreover, the motivations that 
drive individual behavior cannot be understood by simply observing the behavioral 
outcome. In the case of sports facilities attracting more people, investment, or other 
attention to the city, one can easily think of a number of reasons why individuals or 
organizations would move or invest in a locality that may have nothing to do with the 
presence of professional sports. On the other hand, the relationship between migrating 
people and capital and sports facilities may function in the opposite direction. Team 
owners are likely to prefer cities with a strong corporate presence and broadcasting 
market (Delaney and Eckstein, 2003).   
Fan surveys used to assess the value of sports to residents may also be flawed. 
Respondents may tend to exaggerate their “willingness-to-pay” for benefits in surveys, 
particularly if interviewed at the stadium, sports bar or other sites of sports entertainment 
(as is frequently the case). This is a problem of sampling bias since the population of 
stadium-goers is not representative of the population of local taxpayers or residents 
(Babbie, 2002, p. 182-184). Moreover, it is important to consider “who” is likely to 
consume the benefits from the presence of professional sports; more often than not the 
greatest beneficiaries are middle- and upper-class fans (Siegfried and Peterson, 2000) not 
living in the immediate vicinity of the sports facility and not receiving the negative 
impacts of its presence (i.e. traffic, noise, etc).  
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Benefits that are still more difficult to quantify include those that result from 
social gatherings inspired by sporting events such as barbecues, meeting new people as a 
result of having a common interest in the local team, increases in local talk radio 
programs devoted to the successes and failures the local team, and so on (Rappaport and 
Wilkerson, 2001; Rosentraub, 1997; Zimmerman, 1997). At the same time, the presence 
of a professional team may increase traffic in certain parts of the metro area or result in 
cutbacks to alternative television programming that cannot compete with the demand for 
sports, thus reducing their availability for those who would prefer such programming to 
sports. The non-economic benefits of sports must be evaluated through a careful 
consideration of the costs as well.  
While Irani (1997) found that in five U.S. cities the non-economic consumption 
benefits outweighed the massive economic costs of building a stadium, Alexander, Kern 
and Neills (2000) more detailed case studies of four cities found that the social benefits 
were not “worth” the economic costs to residents. Other studies have focused on the 
political costs and benefits of stadium construction (Johnson and Sack, 1996; Pelissero, 
Henschen and Sidlow, 1991), finding that in most cities substantial political capital is 
expended to persuade voters to approve subsidy deals for teams and stadiums. Politicians 
may damage their reputation with residents who are not likely to reap the benefits from 
such projects, such as low-income minorities in central city neighborhoods, or exacerbate 
divisions along racial, class or other lines over the issue to subsidize a sports facility 
(Smith and Ingham, 2003). Moreover, political capital that is expended for one project is 
sacrificed from another, thereby creating a political opportunity cost (Delaney and 
Eckstein, 2003).  
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Still other studies have attempted to understand the extent to which stadiums act 
as catalysts for local economic development. This may occur through complementary 
development, when local businesses are able to benefit from increased pedestrian and 
automobile traffic attributable to the stadium and proximate development that results 
from a more general upturn in the investment climate leading to economic growth 
(Crompton, 2001). The capacity of a stadium to generate positive speculation and attract 
non-local investment by altering the composition of a city’s “quality-of-life” attributes is 
thought to be part of the stadium’s non-economic impact (Crompton, 2001), while the 
associated change in productivity (jobs, income, etc.) resulting from new capital 
investments is measured as the economic impact.  
These studies have been inconclusive for a number of reasons. While it has been 
shown that several cities experienced substantial redevelopment concurrent to the 
development of a professional sports facility (Danielson, 1997), it is not clear to what 
extent the stadium was the catalyst for redevelopment. Other research has shown that 
while stadiums present opportunities for substantial redevelopment of an area, some 
smaller businesses almost always lose out by being crowded out or displaced from the 
neighborhood surrounding the new sports facility (Chapin, 2004). Indeed, non-economic 
impacts ultimately have economic consequences that may be positive or negative. The 
remainder of this chapter reviews the literature that addresses the economic impacts of 
publicly subsidized sports facility construction.   
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Concepts in the Economic Impact Analysis of Sports Facilities 
The most prolific research on the economic impact of sports stadiums is done by 
consultants for city and county officials interested in attracting or retaining a professional 
sports franchise by building a new stadium with public funds. Impact studies 
commissioned by proponents attempt to quantify the effect of hosting a team on a variety 
of local economic indicators such as revenue output, personal income, and jobs 
(Rappaport and Wilkerson, 2001). While most promotional studies argue that increases in 
these indicators justify larger public outlays, independent scholarly research has pointed 
to a number of methodological problems with these studies. In particular, they fail to 
account for the leakage of revenue away from the local area (Chapin, 2002; Siegfried and 
Zimbalist, 2000), the opportunity costs of publicly financing a stadium when dollars 
could have been better spent in other projects (Baade, 2000; Hunter, 1988), and the 
related substitution effect in which spending at the stadium replaces other leisure 
spending in the area (Baade, 2000, 1997; Chapin, 2002; Siegfried and Zimbalist, 2000). 
Moreover, promotional studies are plagued by a number of methodological problems, 
some of which are related to sampling and research design while others are rooted in 
conceptual oversights, such as the three mentioned above. This section will address the 
most common and significant mistakes found in promotional studies and review the 
concepts in the academic literature that facilitate a more valid and precise evaluation of 
the economic impact of professional sports stadia and arenas.   
A careful examination of the factors affecting the capture of revenue generated 
from fan spending is necessary to understand the potential for new stadiums to positively 
impact the localities that help finance them. Before analyzing the various ways in which 
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franchises and their teams produce economic costs and benefits for local communities, it 
is important to recognize that individual professional sports teams are not big business. 
Zimbalist (2000) points out that the average NFL team in 1994, with gross revenues of 
about $65 million, would account for about 0.3 percent of St. Louis’s 1993 Effective 
Buying Income13 (EBI), 0.6 percent of Jacksonville, Florida’s EBI and 0.05 percent of 
New York City’s EBI (p. 58). Rosentraub (1997) concludes that “by themselves, sports 
teams are not economic engines; they have too few employees and involve too few direct 
dollars to be a driving force in any city or county’s economy” (p. 176).  
It is not realistic to expect individual professional sports teams and facilities to 
have a great impact on localities relative to the overall economic activity of the area. 
Small- and medium-size cities have greater potential to experience a larger impact from 
the economic activity generated by professional sports (Zimbalist, 2000). However, all 
cities may be able to expect that under certain conditions sports facilities spur 
incremental economic activity. It is important to consider the factors that determine the 
extent to which a metro area receives positive or negative economic impacts from a 
professional sports facility built and operated with public funds.  
 
Revenue “Leakage” and the Substitution Effect.  
Economic impact analyses (EIA) commissioned by stadium proponents typically 
assume that the spending of all fans at the stadium and subsequently in the surrounding 
neighborhood represents beneficial revenue for the local economy. Moreover, they 
                                                     
13 Defined as personal money income less personal tax and non-tax payments, the EBI is also referred to as 
disposable personal income.  
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assume that all of the sales revenue generated from fan spending impacts economic 
activity in the local jurisdiction. Distinguishing between gross and net spending changes 
is fundamental for accurately estimating the impact of professional sports stadiums 
(Baade, 2000). Two economic principles related to EIA illustrate why this distinction is 
necessary and a more careful examination of the context in which spending occurs is 
warranted. These principles are the substitution effect of increased fan spending and the 
leakage of revenue outside the economy.   
While gross spending represents the total amount of spending induced by a sports 
event, net spending accounts for the amount of spending elsewhere in the local economy 
that is replaced by spending at the sports event and the amount of the sales and tax 
revenue generated that “leaks” out and is re-spent in another jurisdiction. Baade (2000) 
argues that “to the extent that the fan base is largely indigenous to the metropolitan area, 
net spending in the metropolitan area may increase, decrease, or stay constant even 
though gross spending on sports increases significantly” (p. 75). However, the extent to 
which those whose employment is directly or indirectly related to the sports event reside 
locally also affects the economic impact of the sports event (Zimmerman, 1997). This 
group involves anybody whose income is wholly or partly derived from spending related 
to the sports event, including employees of the team, the arena, local hotels and 
restaurants, and others.    
The residence of fans is crucial for accurately measuring the amount of direct 
expenditure that impacts the local economy (Baade and Matheson, 2000). Consumers 
adhere to budgetary constraints in their entertainment spending (whether they are 
conscious of it or not) and are unlikely to dramatically alter their spending because of the 
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presence of a new sports facility (Baade, 2000). Spending by local fans at a sports facility 
and  the surrounding area is likely to replace spending that would have taken place at 
other bars, restaurants, movie theatres, and the like (Baade 2000; Noll and Zimbalist, 
1997). Moreover, the jobs that rely on entertainment spending in other parts of the local 
economy are also replaced when spending is realigned toward the environs of the sports 
facility and other business activity is crowded out (Zimmerman, 1997). However, the 
spending of fans that do not reside locally represents “new money” (Chapin, 2002) since 
in the absence of the sports facility they would not have spent money in the local 
economy. While there are qualifications to this principle, it is generally the case that the 
greater number of visiting fans an event or facility can attract the greater the impact on 
the local economy (Baade and Matheson, 2000; Siegfried and Zimbalist, 2000; Noll and 
Zimbalist, 1997; Rosentraub, 1997).    
A second problem that must be accounted for in EIA is revenue leakage. Leakage 
occurs when revenue from sales or other expenses is not re-spent in the local economy 
(Chapin, 2002; Baade, 2000; Noll and Zimbalist, 1997). In the case of professional sports 
facilities, team owners and athletes, whose salaries account for the largest portion of a 
team’s expenses, are likely to reside and spend most of their earnings outside the local 
jurisdiction (Fort, 2003; Baade, 2000). This is particularly true in the off-season, when 
wealthy athletes and coaches are most likely to vacation or even work outside of the 
jurisdiction where the stadium is located.14 Moreover, if the corporate headquarters of 
team and facility owners (in the case of corporate-owned teams and facilities) are not 
located within the local jurisdiction then the sizable portion of taxable sales that is 
                                                     
14 For example, sports teams typically do their pre-season training in a different county or state than that in 
which they play their home games during the regular season.  
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generated at the stadium will be diverted away from the local economy (Baade and 
Matheson, 2000).   
The design of many recently built sports facilities further undermines the 
likelihood that nearby businesses will benefit from increased traffic induced by the 
stadium. The stadium/mall concept, in which “stadiums have evolved into small, walled 
cities that more completely compete with and capture [local] economic activity,” has 
been encouraged to help level the playing field between teams in professional sports 
leagues (Baade, 2000, p. 78). Many new facilities are equipped with such a wide range of 
consumption activities that fans would have little reason (or money left) to spend outside 
the stadium. Contiguous business and economic activity would not receive the level of 
stimulation suggested by the total amount of spending taking place at the arena (Baade, 
2000).  
These issues are compounded by the fact that municipalities are increasingly 
agreeing to more generous leases that allow teams to appropriate all of the revenue from 
the sale of tickets, concessions, sports paraphernalia, parking, stadium advertising, and 
facility naming rights (Chapin, 2002; Siegfried and Zimbalist, 2000; Baade, 2000; 
Shropshire, 1995). These so-called “sweetheart” leases generally require the team to 
contribute a portion of only one of several revenue streams to satisfy public sector 
demands that the team cover a share of the costs (Altshuler and Luberoff, 2003, p. 35). 
Insomuch as stadiums capture most of the spending facilitated by the sports event and 
teams capture most of these proceeds, the stadium may serve “as little more than a 
conduit by which money flows from one set of non-residents to another” (Baade, 2000).  
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Individuals not employed by the sports franchise but whose employment is related 
to the sports event may also live and spend most of their money outside the local 
jurisdiction. The extent to which this is true is largely determined by the location of the 
sports facility and the local unemployment rate (Baade and Matheson, 2000; 
Zimmerman, 1997). The proximity of a sports facility to the boundary of other counties 
or cities enhances the likelihood that it will attract workers that make their everyday 
purchases and pay taxes outside the local economy. Furthermore, if the local economy is 
at or near full employment, then jobs created by the presence of professional sports are 
more likely to be filled by non-locals (Baade and Matheson, 2000; Zimmerman, 1997).   
While the aforementioned factors represent the largest portions of total spending 
that do not translate into local economic impact, an additional factor is worth noting. The 
intensity of game-day activity could strain local resources to the point where normal local 
business activity is crowded out (Chapin 2002; Baade, 2000). Evidence from qualitative 
research suggests that the sales of local businesses decline on the occasion of sports 
events during the regular season (Delaney and Eckstein, 2003). The increase in car and 
pedestrian traffic and noise resulting from the sports event may discourage other locals, 
who will not attend the event, from spending in the environs of the sports facility.15 These 
negative aspects of the sports event are largely dependent on the location of the facility 
and the residential and commercial character of the community (Fort, 2003; Baade and 
Matheson, 2000).   
For a locality to reap the greatest benefits from spending at the stadium and 
related to the presence of the team, spending by non-local fans must occur in places 
                                                     
15 This is especially true for auto racing, which generates higher noise levels than most sports (Baade and 
Matheson, 2000).  
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where the revenue is captured by locally residing owners and workers. In other words, the 
extent to which the stadium contributes to local economic activity depends on the extent 
to which new money remains and re-circulates through the local economy (Chapin, 2002; 
Baade, 2000; Noll and Zimbalist, 1997; Zimmerman, 1997). Depending on the local 
sports context, recently built sports facilities may be more capable of attracting a greater 
number of non-local fans, thus generating more new money and hence benefits for the 
locality since a greater proportion of sales and tax revenue is being generated locally by 
fans that burden the social services of another community. The extent to which a stadium 
generates new money also depends on the team’s ability to attract a substantial fan base 
from beyond the municipal boundaries.  
 
The Cost of Creating Jobs through Stadium Investments.  
Noll and Zimbalist (1997) stress that the proper evaluation of costs associated 
with a public investment must take account of the opportunity cost of that investment or 
“the sacrifice in other outputs that is necessary to undertake the investment” (p. 60). This 
amount should be considered in addition to the financial cost of the investment and 
weighed against the estimated public benefits in a cost-benefit analysis.  
One way the opportunity cost can be substantial is if the relevant sector of the 
economy from which investment has been diverted is at full employment. Noll and 
Zimbalist (1997) argue that in the case of full employment, “the financial cost of 
acquiring […] resources (the wages of labor, the prices paid for equipment, materials, and 
land) is usually a reasonably accurate indicator of the sacrifice in other products that is 
required for the public investment” (p. 60). When unemployment is low it is more likely 
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that the new jobs created represent a spatial realignment of jobs within the same industry. 
Thus, under these circumstances, the amount of public funds invested in one project 
represents the amount of money diverted from other potential investments. On the other 
hand, if workers are unemployed, or if resources are invested in projects where there is 
low productivity, the opportunity cost may be less than the financial cost of the public 
investment (Noll and Zimbalist, 1997). The opportunity cost may be smaller if the 
increased labor demand caused by the construction and operation of a sports facility is 
met through the greater utilization of local (unemployed) workers. However, if jobs are 
filled by local workers through a realignment of employment within an industry the 
impact on the local economy could be negative.  
The wages paid to workers in jobs created by stadium subsidies may be costs 
rather than benefits. Zimmerman (1997) found that jobs created by investing in sports 
facilities in Baltimore, Maryland cost $127,000 each in taxpayer dollars, compared to 
$6,250 per job created through the state’s Sunny Day Fund for economic development (p. 
123). In other words, in Baltimore, job creation associated with the stadium imposed 
losses on local taxpayers compared to the output from alternative investments. Second, 
while a new sports facility may generate new jobs, these jobs may not significantly 
increase the aggregate income of the local workforce (Baade, 2000; Zimbalist, 2000; 
Zimmerman, 1997). The number and quality of jobs directly created by the acquisition of 
a professional sports franchise are not likely to be better for the local community than the 
types of jobs that would be created in a different sector of the economy. Zimbalist (2000) 
estimated that sports teams typically employ between “50 and 120 full-time workers, 
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along with several hundred low-skill and low-wage, part-time and temporary stadium or 
arena personnel” (p. 59).  
Table 1 presents the relevant wage data for some common types of occupations in 
the spectator sports industry.  The types of jobs likely to become available to the local 
community as the result of the construction of a new stadium are food concession and 
other food service workers, ushers and other attendants, security guards and cleaning and 
maintenance jobs. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) national data on median hourly 
wages in the spectator sports industry indicates that food concession workers in 2004 
earned $7.22 an hour; amusement and recreation attendants earn $7.31; food preparation 
and serving related workers earn $7.56; ushers, lobby attendants and ticket takers earn 
$7.88; parking lot attendants earn $8.07; janitors and cleaners earn $8.47; building and 
grounds maintenance workers earn $8.96; “personal care and service occupations,” which 
make up over 22 percent of the industry’s workforce nationally, earn $8.26 an hour.  The 
BLS also provides data for the 10th percentile of the wage hierarchy in these job sectors, 
where many median wages are under $6 (i.e. for food concessions, ushers and ticket 
takers, janitors and cleaners, and various other “attendants”).  
 
Table 1. Spectator Sports Occupations and Related Statistics   
Occupation 
Mean 
Annual 
Wage 
Median 
Annual 
Wage 
Mean 
Hourly 
Wage 
Median 
Hourly 
Wage 
Hourly 10th 
Percentile 
Wage 
Percent 
of 
Industry
Counter attendants,  
cafeteria, food 
concession, & coffee 
shop 
$15,470 $15,030 $7.44 $7.22 $5.72 2.52 
Combined food 
preparation  
& serving workers, 
including fast food 
$15,230 $14,730 $7.32 $7.08 $5.73 0.80 
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Amusement & recreation  
attendants $16,950 $15,210 $8.15 $7.31 $5.73 3.16 
Food preparation &  
serving related  
$17,550 $15,730 $8.44 $7.56 $5.74 9.02 
Entertainment attendants  
& related workers, all 
other 
$16,570 $14,600 $7.96 $7.02 $5.78 0.31 
Ushers, lobby attendants,  
& ticket takers 
$17,770 $16,380 $8.54 $7.88 $5.81 6.68 
Coaches & scouts $61,400 $22,270 * * $5.90 3.41 
Personal care & service  $19,990 $17,190 $9.61 $8.26 $5.92 22.39 
Parking lot attendants $17,320 $16,780 $8.33 $8.07 $5.93 1.20 
Cashiers $20,460 $18,060 $9.84 $8.68 $6.26 4.02 
Nonfarm animal  
caretakers $19,140 $17,630 $9.20 $8.48 $6.28 5.09 
Janitors & cleaners,  
except maids & 
housekeeping  
$19,540 $17,610 $9.39 $8.47 $6.43 2.57 
Building & grounds  
cleaning & 
maintenance  
$21,970 $18,640 $10.56 $8.96 $6.63 5.50 
Sales & related  $25,030 $20,660 $12.03 $9.93 $6.70 9.22 
Landscaping &  
groundskeeping  
$21,240 $18,860 $10.21 $9.07 $6.76 1.86 
Office & administrative  
support  
$27,730 $25,180 $13.33 $12.11 $6.95 12.05 
Protective service  $24,640 $21,130 $11.85 $10.16 $7.02 6.49 
Security guards $23,160 $20,970 $11.13 $10.08 $7.04 5.35 
Arts, design,  
entertainment,  
sports, & media  
$71,140 $37,580 $34.20 $18.07 $7.05 15.20 
Management  
occupations $90,190 $71,690 $43.36 $34.47 $16.19 5.02 
Chief executives $160,580 * $77.20 * $37.94 0.40 
Athletes & sports  
competitors $103,910 $65,960 * * * 6.34 
Umpires, referees, &  
other sports officials 
$37,890 $21,830 * * * 1.78 
Athletic trainers $53,630 $42,950 * * * 0.38 
Industry Total $35,920 $21,920 $7.27 $10.54 $6.44 100.00 
*Data not available 
Source: National Industry-Specific Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates: NAICS 711200, Bureau 
of Labor Statistics, May 2004 
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In addition, many of the low-wage jobs cited above are typically “on call” and 
ultimately provide an unreliable and insufficient source of income (Zimbalist, 2000; 
Baade and Sanderson, 1997). It is unlikely that these jobs would provide health benefits, 
hence contributing to the state’s social welfare burden.16 Even for those jobs created at 
sports facilities that do not replace other local jobs, their impact on the total income 
within the recreation and amusement industry is likely to be insignificant because of the 
poor quality of such jobs. Ultimately, when evaluating the economic impact of a 
subsidized sports facility, the state of the local economy and the value of alternative 
investments must be considered in order to account for the opportunity cost of the 
subsidy. 
 
Promotional Studies and the Use of Multipliers.  
Stadium subsidy proponents typically claim that increased fan spending from a 
new sports facility will generate a chain reaction of additional sales, income and 
employment throughout the local economy. Their argument is based on the multiplier 
concept, in which new spending in a local economy stimulates economic activity by 
creating additional business turnover and subsequent job opportunities, household 
income, and tax revenue (Fort, 2003; Hudson, 2001). The direct impacts of spending 
occur when the revenue from new spending is re-spent locally and indirect impacts take 
place in subsequent rounds of spending (Howard and Crompton, 1995). An initial 
                                                     
16 Labor markets in many states are transforming into an “hourglass economy,” in which there is far more 
growth among high and low wage jobs compared to middle-income jobs. A recent study in California 
found that the low-wage segments of the expanding service and retail sector are unlikely to receive health 
benefits and as a result, public assistance is increasingly becoming a wage supplement for low-wage 
workers rather than emergency assistance (Zabin, Dube and Jacobs, 2004).  
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injection of money (e.g., at a new sports arena or local restaurant) may be re-spent (1) by 
local businesses when they make inter-industry purchases to restock their supplies, 
maintain their buildings and property and for a number of other purposes; (2) on the 
wages and salaries of local employees; (3) on local sales, property and other taxes; (4) on 
taxes levied by non-local governments; (5) and on employees, businesses, and others who 
reside or spend money outside the local jurisdiction (Howard and Crompton, 1995, p. 
59).  
The last two expenditures represent ways in which new money leaks out of the 
local economy. The contextual dynamics of the first three types of expenditures (inter-
industry purchases, employees and taxes) determine the size of the multiplier value. For 
example, big cities are more likely than small towns to have locally-based inter-industry 
networks, hence reducing the degree of leakage (Fort, 2003; Hudson, 2001). The sectors 
of the economy and the types of expenditures that are made also affect the size of the 
multiplier. Certain industries and transactions are more likely than others to leak money 
through extra-local purchases and taxes (Fort, 2003). Less of the spending by a local 
construction firm that purchases cement that is manufactured locally will leak out of the 
economy compared to a local restaurant that imports most of its wine. In the case of 
taxes, there is variation among states and municipal governments in the degree to which 
economic activity generates or forgoes tax revenue. Some states and localities incur an 
opportunity cost when they grant tax exemptions for certain types of purchases, such as 
building materials, to attract new investment (Fort, 2003). The ripple effects of new 
money are also limited through individual saving habits. Some of the new spending 
induced by a sports facility becomes household income for local residents through 
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salaries and wages and is less likely to be reinvested locally. People typically save a 
portion of their income, in which case this money contributes nothing further to the local 
economy within the period in which the multiplier effect is considered (Howard and 
Crompton, 1995, p. 60).  
As noted above, economic impact analyses (EIA) commissioned by the 
proponents of stadium subsidies often overstate the economic impacts of sports facilities 
on local economies (Fort, 2003; Chapin, 2002; Baade, 2000; Noll and Zimbalist, 1997; 
Howard and Crompton, 1995). The exaggerated benefits found in promotional EIA often 
stem from one or more misapplications of sales, income or employment multipliers to 
measure the “ripple effects” of incremental spending induced by a new sports facility 
(Hudson, 2001; Baade 2000, 1997; Howard and Crompton, 1995). Moreover, when 
surveys of fan spending are carried out by consultants, the sampling procedures and 
research design are often systematically biased in favor of large economic impacts 
(Delaney and Eckstein, 2003; Fort, 2003). Howard and Crompton (1995) and Hudson 
(2001) find that the most common and most significant oversights are (1) the inclusion of 
spending by local spectators, (2) failure to exclude time-switchers and casuals from the 
spending estimates, (3) the application of multiplier values taken out of context and (4) 
the use of a sales multiplier (which tends to be the largest) to indicate the income or 
employment benefit to local residents.  
Before a multiplier effect can be gauged the initial, direct impact of fan spending 
that is induced by a new sports facility must be estimated. A common method used by 
consultants to gauge the spillover effects of fan spending is the distribution of paper 
surveys to fans at the stadium (Delaney and Eckstein, 2003; Chapin, 2002; Crompton, 
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1995). While survey research can be an effective and reliable method of studying the 
spending patterns of a group of people, various measures must be taken to ensure that a 
representative sample of respondents is taken and that the conceptual object of interest, 
visitor fan spending, is effectively isolated and measured. While there are other important 
methodological considerations, these appear to be the most common sources of oversight 
in promotional survey research (Delaney and Eckstein, 2003; Hudson, 2001; Noll and 
Zimbalist, 1997; Howard and Crompton, 1995).  
A study conducted by Arthur Anderson surveyed fans at Philadelphia Phillies 
baseball games and asked about their place of residence, their means of transportation to 
the game, where they worked and how much they spent on various items before and after 
the game (Anderson Study, 1997, qtd. in Delaney and Eckstein, 2003, p. 35-37). At five 
games, a total of 1,652 responses were obtained, from which the consultants found that 
fans spent an average of $23.22, not including parking. This figure was multiplied by the 
total annual attendance in order to estimate the impact of induced spending in the local 
neighborhood. Since the details of the sampling procedure in the Anderson Study were 
not provided (Delaney and Eckstein, 2003, p. 36) one can only make a best guess as to 
the methods that were used. A likely scenario is that surveys were handed to fans on their 
way in the stadium and while many simply threw it away, some chose to respond. Bias is 
introduced since fans with certain characteristics may be more likely than others to 
respond (Babbie, 2002). Tourists, in particular, who are likely to spend more before and 
after the game, may be more likely to respond to a survey, thus biasing the spending total 
upwards.  
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A more serious flaw in the Philadelphia impact study may have been its 
inattention to the amount of persons for which each spending total was reported. For 
example, Delaney and Eckstein (2003) point out that since the survey included questions 
about place of work, it may have been targeted at adults and thus the proportion of 
children at the stadium remains unknown while the spending reported by adults likely 
includes that of their children (p. 37). Multiplying the average fan spending figure by 
total attendance exaggerates spending since children may be double counted or even 
triple counted.  
However, even these oversights are minor compared to the most frequent and 
egregious of the assumptions made by promotional studies. As discussed previously in 
this chapter, the spending of local spectators at the new arena replaces entertainment 
spending they would have done elsewhere in the local economy. In most cases, economic 
benefits from fan spending can only be expected when such spending is done by fans 
who are visiting the local jurisdiction to attend the sporting event. In the case of a 
replacement facility, non-local fan attendance at the new arena must be compared to that 
of the old arena and the difference, if positive, may impart economic benefits on the host 
community (Rappaport and Wilkerson, 2001). Thus, economic impact studies of existing 
or proposed studies must be designed to isolate the spending of non-local fans, in 
addition to accurately estimating average spending.  
A study commissioned by the proponents of a new baseball stadium in Phoenix, 
Arizona based their impact findings on the spending of all fans expected to attend the 
new facility in a given year (Pollack Study, 1998). This is problematic since more than 60 
percent of Arizona’s total population resides in Maricopa County, in which Phoenix is 
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located and whose residents were taxed to raise funds for the new ballpark (Delaney and 
Eckstein, 2003). The local jurisdiction in the case of Phoenix is so large that it is 
extremely unlikely that the Diamondbacks will generate a significant non-local fan 
base.17 Most of baseball fan spending in Phoenix therefore represents a realignment of 
leisure spending rather than a net benefit to the local economy – a crucial point 
overlooked by the Pollack Study. The same oversight was repeated in an impact study the 
following year in nearby San Diego: the spending of local fans was included in the final 
impact estimate, which projected the creation of 5,000 jobs and $600 million in annual 
benefits from spillover spending (Delaney and Eckstein, 2003, p. 147).  
Analysis of the impact of a new downtown replacement arena in Sacramento 
forecasted about $90 million in annual benefits to the City after accounting for the 
anticipated sales revenue from the spending of all fans at the stadium and the surrounding 
neighborhood (Sacramento Study, n.d.). The authors of the study also included in their 
EIA estimates of anticipated investment by public and private sector entities that could be 
attributed to the presence of the new arena. However, they do not consider the value of 
the sacrifice of alternative investments or the displacement of local residents leisure 
spending at other local venues and at the existing arena, hence they overstate the direct 
spending impacts that the investment in a new arena has on the local economy 
(Sacramento Study, 2002).  
Ryan (2005) forecasted a 7 year economic windfall associated with the NFL’s New 
Orleans Saints of $3.64 billion by focusing on the “direct spending that would be lost to the 
                                                     
17 Given that Arizona contains few metropolitan areas that are separated from each other by long stretches 
of desert that can be very hot in the summer during baseball season, it is unlikely that Phoenix can attract a 
significant portion of the 40 percent of the state population that do not already live in the city (Delaney and 
Eckstein, 2003). 
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state’s economy if the team were to leave” (p. 13). By framing his research in this way Ryan 
considers the total economic activity related to the football team and the stadium as a loss. 
Instead, only non-local spending induced by the facility should be considered a loss since 
local fans will likely find other entertainment venues in which to invest their time and 
money. Moreover, Ryan reports only the benefits of the Saints stadium, thus failing to 
consider a number of costs that subsidizing the sports facility imposes on local taxpayers. 
Promotional studies like these distort the economic reality of professional sports by failing 
to reduce the initial direct spending by the amount the represent a realignment of spending 
on entertainment in the local economy. These mistakes are later compounded when 
multipliers are applied and benefits are projected into the multi-millions and billions.  
Even when measures are taken to isolate non-local fan attendance, a portion of the 
substitution effect may remain unaccounted for. Similar to local spectators, time-
switchers and casuals would have spent their money elsewhere within the local economy 
had it not been for the sporting event and their spending should not be considered a 
contribution to the local economy (Howard and Crompton, 1995; Crompton, 2001). 
Time-switchers are spectators that had been planning to visit the community but altered 
the timing of their travel plans to coincide with the sporting event. Casuals are those non-
local fans who were drawn to the area by other local attractions but decided to spend their 
money at the arena instead (Howard and Crompton, 1995, p. 75). These fans are difficult 
to distinguish without conducting original research that asks spectators about their place 
of residence and reasons for attending the sports facility (Howard and Crompton 1995). 
None of the promotional studies mentioned above included questions designed to capture 
fans’ motivations for attending the sports facility. However, in the absence of such data, a 
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few independent academic analysts have attempted to account for time-switchers and 
casuals by simply reducing the estimated proportion of non-local fans to a more 
conservative figure, taking into consideration the context of the local tourism market 
(Baade, 1997; Baade and Matheson, 2000; Crompton, 2001; Hamilton and Kahn, 1997;).    
Once the direct spending is estimated as accurately as possible, the appropriate 
multiplier must be chosen and applied. Often in EIA researchers will employ a multiplier 
value derived by surveying the methods used in other studies (Hudson, 2001; Howard 
and Crompton, 1995). Multiplier values for sales, income or employment are not easily 
interchangeable between one local economy and another. As mentioned above, the size of 
the multiplier depends on the characteristics of the local economy. While the range of a 
multiplier value may vary less for some sectors of the economy, in others the range is 
widely divergent according to the local context (Fort, 2003). In addition, the size of the 
local economy is important as larger communities allow dollars to pass through more 
rounds of spending before being exhausted or lost beyond the local jurisdiction (Fort, 
2003; Hudson, 2001; Howard and Crompton, 1995).  
Many EIA present their findings in terms of increased sales by using a sales 
multiplier. However, the sales multiplier tends to be larger than the income or 
employment multiplier since it reflects the greater number of transactions that occur 
among local businesses compared to those of residents or workers (Hudson, 2001; 
Howard and Crompton, 1995). Fulton’s (1988) analysis of tourism in Galveston finds that 
the same amount of money spent in retail shopping generates $1.2 million in new sales 
but only $0.5 million in personal income. Furthermore, the sales multiplier is not useful 
since the appropriate focus of a study of the impacts of a public investment is the impact 
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of spending on household income or employment (i.e., the impact on taxpayers) (Howard 
and Crompton, 1995, p. 62).   
Finally, the employment multiplier is thought to be less reliable than sales or 
income multipliers since it rests on the assumption that the labor force is fully utilized 
(Zimbalist, 2000; Howard and Crompton, 1995). Should there be no unemployment then 
new (imported) investment could generate a net increase in the number of jobs and new 
workers would migrate to fill those positions, thus expanding the financial base of the 
local economy. This is an untenable assumption insomuch as unemployment, a 
characteristic of all metropolitan areas, presents the possibility of meeting new demands 
through greater utilization of local labor. This is particularly the case for “one-time” 
sports events like the Olympics or sports that have very few games and create few 
permanent jobs (Howard and Crompton, 1995, p. 61). Local labor can also be made to 
work harder with no corresponding increase in pay. However, insomuch as local labor 
markets are not optimally efficient (e.g., through hiring networks), the possibility remains 
that new demand will create new jobs and leave local residents underutilized (Hudson, 
2001, p. 22-23).  
As this discussion illustrates, additional contextual factors are brought to bear on 
the employment multiplier compared to the sales and income multipliers. Furthermore, 
this discussion builds on our understanding of revenue leakage and the substitution effect 
and reveals the extent of methodological oversight in promotional studies. Analysis of the 
multiple effects of new spending must consider only the sales and tax revenue that is 
generated by non-local fans and can be expected to remain and re-circulate throughout 
the local economy. Recent studies conducted by independent scholars have utilized the 
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concepts discussed above to measure the magnitude and significance of the economic 
impacts of sports facilities on local economies. The next section reviews the findings and 
insights of this recent research.  
 
Comparative Research on Stadium Impacts  
A review of the literature on the economic impacts of sports facilities reveals 
three basic approaches. The first compares economic activity in cities with and without 
professional sports teams and attempts to isolate the team effect by controlling for other 
factors that affect economic activity in a city (Baade, 1994; Rosentraub, 1994; Walden, 
1997). The second and more frequent approach is also comparative, but observes cities 
before and after they acquired a new team or a new stadium, similarly controlling for 
other growth related variables (Santo, 2005; Austrian and Rosentraub, 2002; Richardson, 
2002; Nelson, 2001; Coates and Humphreys, 2001, 1999; Baade, 2000, 1996; Baade and 
Sanderson, 1997; Rosentraub, 1997, 1994). The third approach is the cost-benefit method 
which attempts to account for full array of costs and benefits that are generated by a 
professional sports facility in order to measure the value added to the local community in 
terms of income, jobs, or other measures (Rappaport and Wilkerson, 2001; Baade, 1997; 
Hamilton and Kahn, 1997).  
Baade’s (1994) study of the growth of per capita personal income in 48 metro 
areas from 1958 to 1987 finds no significant difference between metro areas with major 
league teams and those without. Using a similar research design, Walden (1997) finds a 
negative relationship between economic growth and the presence of a stadium. Baade and 
Sanderson (1997) took a different approach to examining stadium impacts on 
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employment and income by studying ten metro areas from 1958 to 1993 before and after 
they obtained new franchises.  They found that adding a professional sports team or 
stadium to a city’s economy realigns entertainment and recreation spending rather than 
adding to it. Accordingly, no new jobs are created and in many cases, jobs are lost and 
wages decline (Baade and Sanderson, 1997, p. 109).  
Coates and Humphreys (2001, 1999) also find that the presence of professional 
sports franchises reduced the level of per capita income in metropolitan areas while 
increasing the number of jobs. Their analysis focuses on the relationship between sports 
facilities and real per capita personal income in 37 standard metropolitan statistical areas 
in the U.S. from 1969 to 1994 and controls for factors not related to the sports industry 
that may explain changes in per capita income. Their model demonstrates positive effects 
on employment and earnings in amusements and recreation but negative effects on 
employment in the retail sector, and on earnings in eating and drinking establishments 
and hotels (Coates and Humphreys, 2001). According to Coates and Humphreys (2001), 
“the negative effect of sports on earnings of employees of restaurants and bars, and on 
employment in Retail and Services supports the idea that sports reduce real per capita 
income in cities through both substitution in private spending and through the creation of 
new jobs which pay less than the average prevailing wage” (p. 16).  
On the other hand, the research of Rosentraub (1997, 1994), which has also used a 
comparative approach to studying employment and income growth, singles out 
Indianapolis as a unique and contrasting case that illustrates the potential for new 
stadiums to benefit host communities when constructed in the right context. Rosentraub’s 
(1994) analysis of the impact of the RCA dome in Indianapolis in the 1980’s revealed a 
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significant difference between wage increases there compared to other mid-western cities 
that had not constructed a stadium. While Rosentraub’s (1997, 1994) overall findings 
suggest that the acquisition of sports facilities had an insignificant and sometimes 
negative impact on employment and urbanization, Indianapolis’ use of sports events and 
facilities yielded mixed but slightly positive results. Indianapolis is the one city in 
Baade's (1994) research that evidenced a statistically significant impact on the city's real 
per capita growth in conjunction with the relocation of a stadium.  
The construction of the RCA Dome in the 1980’s was part of an integrated sports-
development strategy, including hosting two professional sports franchises, several 
amateur teams and national and international sports events, in conjunction with a 
downtown redevelopment initiative consisting of many non-sport, recreation and 
entertainment venues (Rosentraub, 1997, 1994). Rosentraub (1994) found that the goals 
of the redevelopment program were partially met since the rate of suburbanization in 
Indianapolis slowed considerably compared to other cities. At the same time, the slightly 
positive job growth was insignificant as sports were too small a component of the local 
economy to have a significant impact (Rosentraub, 1994).  
In a more focused study, Austrian and Rosentraub (2002) compare four cities and 
re-examine whether the integrated stadium-downtown redevelopment strategy was 
successful in improving the central city’s share of regional jobs and residents. While the 
rate of job loss to the suburbs slowed substantially for all four cities over this period, they 
could find no causal link between the sports facilities and the location of jobs (Austrian 
and Rosentraub, 2002, p. 556-558). Zimbalist (2000) finds that most of the employment 
growth in Indianapolis was in low-wage occupations in the sectors of the economy 
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related to spectator sports and Indianapolis's share of the total county payroll actually 
declined from 1977 to 1989. Thus, while there seems to be potential for net job creation, 
new jobs appear to be unable to positively impact income levels.  
Nonetheless, the research of Baade (1996, 1994) and Austrian and Rosentraub 
(2002) represents preliminary evidence of the importance of context for the economic 
impact of professional sports facilities. Nelson (2001) reviews the data and findings from 
each of these studies and finds a pattern. In at least half of the cities in which Baade 
detected a positive association between MSA income share and the acquisition of a 
professional sports facility, the new facility was located in a central business district 
(CBD). By contrast, in five of eight cities exhibiting negative associations between MSA 
income share and stadium acquisition, the facilities were built in the suburbs or outside of 
central city neighborhoods (Nelson, 2001).  
Nelson (2001) follows up his meta-analysis with original research in which he 
estimates the effect of the location of sports facilities on regional income share for 26 
metropolitan areas. Controlling for demographic and economic factors that influence 
MSA wealth, he finds that facilities located in a CBD are positively associated with 
regional income share and facilities in other locations, especially in suburban locations, 
are negatively associated with regional income share (Nelson, 2001). In addition, Nelson 
(2001) finds evidence of positive agglomeration effects for sports facilities located in a 
CBD compared to other locations. That is, the greater the number of stadiums in a CBD, 
the greater the positive effect on regional income share. The same is true for the negative 
effect of non-CBD facilities on regional income share (Nelson, 2001).  
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Santo (2005) takes the same approach as previous researchers in examining 
income and employment impacts from sports stadiums, but like Nelson he recasts the 
analysis in the recent context of increasingly urban location preferences for the 
construction of professional sports facilities. Focusing on stadiums built between 1984 
and 2001, Santo (2005) hypothesizes that  
 
a retro-style ballpark in a downtown or retail setting is likely to attract visitors from 
a wider area than its more utilitarian suburban counterpart, and is likely to induce 
longer stays and greater ancillary spending. If so, it is plausible that the new 
generation of sports facilities would have more favorable economic impacts than 
their predecessors. (p. 181)  
 
Santo estimates two regression equations. The first one examines the impact of 
sports-related variables on aggregate MSA income in the region. The second equation 
examines the impact of the same explanatory variables on the MSA’s share of the 
region’s income. The predictor variables include the MSA’s population and a trend 
variable accounting change in time, in addition to variables indicating the renovation or 
construction of a baseball or football stadium and the presence of a baseball or football 
franchise (Santo, 2005). The results of the second equation, which is better able to control 
for regional growth trends, sheds light on the importance of context for the economic 
impacts of sports facilities. Santo (2005) finds evidence that the choice of location for a 
new stadium affects the magnitude of the return from the investment. The six cities for 
which the presence of a new football or baseball stadium is significantly positively 
correlated with regional income share – Atlanta, Denver, Jacksonville, Seattle and Tampa 
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– all represent cases in which sports facilities were built in a downtown or central city 
environment (Santo, 2005, p. 188).  
While these findings do seem to support Santo’s assertion that context matters, his 
use of the term context is unclear. By context Santo seems to be referring to two variables 
which were not emphasized in previous research: the location of new stadiums and 
whether a sports facility is being constructed or renovated to attract a new team or to 
retain an old team. Thus, his findings support his hypothesis that stadiums built for new 
teams locating to central business districts have the most potential for significant positive 
economic impacts on MSA’s relative to the region.  
Conventional logic would seem to support the findings of Santo (2005) and 
Nelson (2001), as adding a professional sports franchise to an area of concentrated 
commercial and retail venues would enhance the likelihood that the team generates 
additional new spending in that area, certainly more than would take place at suburban 
facilities surrounded by parking lots. However, like Austrian and Rosentraub (2002) 
previously, Santo and Nelson are not able to isolate the impact of the sports stadium from 
the overall effect of the redevelopment strategy of central business districts. Since sports 
facilities represent only a tiny fraction of an area’s economy, its growth impact 
independent of an area’s economic development initiatives is likely to be negligible 
(Zimbalist, 2000; Rosentraub, 1997). In addition, in his reply to Nelson, Wassmer (2001) 
argues that a new team is likely to be attracted to a city with a strong economy, hence 
offering a profitable media market (p. 269-270). Other researchers have found that team 
owners are wising up to the fact that in young, growing cities it is easier to raise public 
funds for new stadiums (Delaney and Eckstein, 2003). If the years following the 
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acquisition of new teams and stadiums in downtown locations exhibit significant 
increases in economic activity, this may reflect the wise business strategies of team 
owners and league cartels rather than impacts caused by the sports facility.  
The comparative research on stadium impacts has virtually unanimously found 
negligible or negative impacts from sports facilities. Where positive effects have been 
detected, additional empirical precision is needed to disentangle the effect of sports 
facilities from other factors. While comparative research has approached the study of 
stadium impacts from a more macro perspective, cost-benefit research takes a closer look 
at the ways in which publicly funded sports facilities impart positive or negative effects 
on a local economy.  
 
Cost-Benefit Analysis of Stadium Impacts 
The cost-benefit method of measuring economic impacts has most frequently 
been used (or misused) in promotional studies, as described above. Few independent 
scholarly attempts have been made to gauge net economic impact by accounting for the 
wide range and complex nature of the “real” (Chapin, 2002) inputs and outputs involved 
in stadium acquisition. However, three examples are available in the independent, 
academic literature on stadium impacts.  
Rappaport and Wilkerson (2001) and Baade (1997) use a prospective impact 
approach, in which they estimate future costs and benefits from the inputs and outputs 
associated with the construction and operation of a new stadium. While the first pair of 
authors focus on the present net value of new jobs and tax revenue, Baade (1997) 
compares the return on the public’s investment in a stadium to other possible 
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investments. Hamilton and Kahn (1997) carry out a retrospective cost-benefit analysis of 
Baltimore’s new stadiums. All three studies consider the same inputs and outputs in their 
assessment of the economic costs and benefits of pro sports facilities. As inputs, they 
simply calculate the monetary total of various public resources invested into the 
construction and operation of the sports facility. As outputs, they consider the value of 
importing jobs and tax revenue through incremental spending by fans that reside outside 
of the host MSA (Baade, Rappaport and Wilkerson) or the state (Hamilton and Kahn).  
Other economic impact measures (e.g., wage levels) may be substituted for job 
creation, but most of the recent scholarly research on stadium impacts has argued that job 
creation is the best gauge of economic impact (Baade and Sanderson, 1997; Coates and 
Humphreys, 2000) and some have demonstrated how the impact from new jobs can be 
interpreted as an impact on home values (Hamilton and Kahn, 1997; Siegfried and 
Zimbalist, 2000). Moreover, analysis of the relationship between new stadiums and local 
wage levels (as opposed to job creation) has found insignificant and in some cases 
negative effects (Baade and Sanderson, 1997; Zimbalist, 2000).  
Rappaport and Wilkerson (2001) develop an approach to estimating prospective 
employment and tax revenue impacts that is generally applicable to each professional 
sports league. They suggest that net job creation can be estimated in a straight-forward 
manner by applying a conservative multiplier to number of observable new jobs 
associated with the stadium’s operation (Rappaport and Wilkerson, 2001, p. 64). The 
construction of the stadium also creates jobs but research has demonstrated that these 
substitute other employment in the construction industry and produce an insignificant 
impact (Miller, 2002). Net jobs created can be multiplied by the estimated value of each 
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new job to the metro area economy to determine the economic benefit from job creation 
(Rappaport and Wilkerson, 2001, p. 64).18 
Annual tax revenue benefits are determined by considering average visitor fan 
attendance and typical spending by these fans on admissions, concessions, novelty items 
and spending in the environs of the stadium (Rappaport and Wilkerson, 2001). Rappaport 
and Wilkerson (2001) convert the annual benefits from new jobs and tax revenue to net 
present values and find that the estimated value of the combined employment and tax 
benefits from a sports facility hosting a typical NBA team is about $29 million (p. 68).  
Compared to typical public outlays in recent years ranging from $150 to $250 million, 
the projected economic benefits from new stadiums do not outweigh the costs (Rappaport 
and Wilkerson, 2001, p. 70). 
Baade’s (1997) prospective impact analysis of a proposed stadium for the Seattle 
Mariners framed the issue in terms of the return on equity of the public’s investment. As 
such, he measured outputs in terms of monetary returns from incremental economic 
activity and did not convert “new money” into new jobs. Baade (1997) argues that from 
the “public-interest perspective,” the best evaluation of a proposed sports facility is the 
return on that investment compared to the return from an investment of the same 
magnitude in a different sector of the economy, such as U.S. Treasury Bonds, the leisure 
time industry and the gaming industry (p. 6-7).  
                                                     
18 Rappaport and Wilkerson (2001) survey the findings of research that uses quantitative techniques to 
estimate economic benefits from job creation induced by a new pro sports facility. The aggregate annual 
income benefit to local workers is found to range from $0 to $1500. In other words, if a new job is worth 
$1500 to a local workforce, then 100 jobs created by a new arena for a workforce of 1 million would result 
in a wage increase of 15 cents ([1500/1000000]*100).  
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Baade (1997) carried out his analysis without knowing what arrangements would 
ultimately be agreed upon in the negotiations over the proposed stadium. As a result, he 
considered the best case scenario and the most likely scenario in light of the perceived 
bargaining strengths and weaknesses of local officials in the particular case. The 
proposed taxpayer investment in the new stadium was about $267.8 million, coming from 
a local sales tax credit, local restaurant and bar taxes, admissions taxes, and car rental 
taxes and the annual return from incremental local sales tax revenue, incremental rent 
paid at the stadium, and the county’s share of other stadium revenue was estimated at 
about $3.7 million (Baade, 1997, p. 7). The estimated revenue increment from the 
spending of non-local fans was $2.7 million assuming peak attendance and $1.4 million 
assuming a more realistic attendance figure. Baade (1997) found that in the optimistic 
scenario Seattle taxpayers return on equity in their investment in a new stadium would be 
1.9 percent, far below returns from alternative investments in the gaming industry (11.5 
percent), the leisure time industry (13.5 percent) or U.S. Treasury Bonds (5.85 percent).  
While the analyses of Rapport and Wilkerson (2001) and Baade (1997) are 
prospective in nature, Hamilton and Kahn’s (1997) case study of Baltimore’s recently 
built stadiums is retrospective. Hamilton and Kahn (1997) attempted to account for all the 
measurable benefits of the Camden Yards investment in Baltimore, including job creation 
and tax imports, by reducing the amount of new revenue to account for the realignment of 
local spending and the leakage of revenue outside the local economy. First, they 
determined the magnitude of the incremental expenditure due to the facility. Second, they 
estimated the number of jobs created directly by the incremental expenditure. Third, they 
determined the appropriate multiplier with which to calculate the total employment 
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effect. Finally, they estimated the effect of this induced employment on metro area wages 
and property values (Hamilton and Kahn, 1997).  
To determine the incremental expenditure attributed to the new stadium Hamilton 
and Kahn had to calculate the increase in fan attendance caused by the new facility. 
Using data on the number of visitor fans collected at the stadium, they attribute 71 
percent of the attendance increase at the new stadium to new non-local fans (Hamilton 
and Kahn, 1997, p. 260). They calculated that the difference in the average basic gate 
receipts and other stadium revenues between the four years before and after the move to 
the new stadium attributable to non-local fans was about $16 million (Hamilton and 
Kahn, 1997, p. 262). Using data from a stadium fan survey, Hamilton and Kahn 
determined the total “before-and-after” game (outside the stadium) spending by non-local 
fans and the proportion of the non-stadium spending that was done by new19 non-local 
fans. The total incremental visitor fan expenditure is estimated at $41 million (Hamilton 
and Kahn, 1997, p. 263-264).  
Hamilton and Kahn (1997) theorize the dynamics by which a new stadium 
impacts economic activity in the surrounding environment. The demand for labor rises 
corresponding to the net increase in local exports caused by new non-local fan spending, 
as discussed above. Worker wages increase as the supply curve of urban labor rises in 
response to greater demand. As more workers are attracted to the locality, the cost of 
living rises mainly through increasing property values. Thus, “the entire present value of 
the economic benefit of an increase in exports (an increase in city size) is captured by 
local property owners; the present value of the wage increase is capitalized into house 
                                                     
19 New refers to the number of non-local fans at the new facility above those that attended games at the old 
facility.  
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values” (Hamilton and Kahn, 1997, p. 264). By contrast, the wage increase of people 
renting their homes is expended in higher rent.  
Assuming that half of the incremental expenditure in Baltimore is spent on local 
labor,20 the incremental non-local expenditure in Baltimore is directly responsible for 460 
initial new jobs and a total of 550 jobs after accounting for the “ripple effects” of the 
incremental spending at the stadium (Hamilton and Kahn, 1997, p. 266).21 To gauge the 
effect of the sports stadium on wages and property values, the authors employ Rosen's 
(1979) model, in which the annual earnings of workers is a function of a index of metro 
area characteristics, including city size and amenities (Hamilton and Kahn, 1997, p. 31). 
Hamilton and Kahn (1997) find that an increment of 500 jobs raises the average 
metropolitan area workers’ wage by 40 cents (p. 267). As the authors argue that wage 
increments are capitalized into property values, they calculate that at 1.6 workers per 
household and a rent-to-home value ratio of .10, the construction of the new stadium 
raised house values by $6.50 each. In terms of employment impact, the aggregate annual 
benefit to a workforce of 1.2 million was found to be $480,000 (Hamilton and Kahn, 
1997, p. 267). Comparing the various subsidies to net benefits from the incremental fan 
expenditure and the annual benefit to the local workforce, Hamilton and Kahn (1997) 
estimated that the new ballpark resulted in a net cost to taxpayers of $11 million, or 
$14.70 per year per metro household (p. 268).  
                                                     
20 From U.S. Department of Commerce data they find that labor’s share of the national economy is about 
73 percent but they reason that the proportion of income induced by professional sports that flows to local 
labor is likely to be smaller. 
 
21 Hamilton and Kahn use a conservative employment multiplier of 1.2. Typical employment multipliers 
used by governmental economic development agencies range from 1.8 to 2 (Hefner, 1990; Baade, 1996; 
City of Miami “EIA” for selected projects 1996-2000).  Several authors suggest that lower employment 
multipliers are more appropriate since most sports-related employment is likely to be part-time and 
temporary (Howard and Crompton, 1995).   
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 Review of the literature reveals a general consensus among scholars regarding the 
economic impact of professional sports facilities on local economies. First, the majority 
of the findings suggest that the economic impacts are insignificant. Second, in many 
cases the impacts of sports facilities are negative in terms of fiscal losses for the local 
jurisdiction, a decline in the income of local workers and/or a decline in the local 
economy’s share of regional or state income. The impact of the American Airlines Arena 
in Miami is unlikely to diverge considerably from the findings of other research. The next 
chapter presents the methods for a cost-benefit analysis of the AAA.   
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Chapter IV 
Methodology 
 
 Analysis of the costs and benefits of the AAA is comprised of two parts. The first 
examines the net fiscal cost or benefit to Miami-Dade County after considering the 
various public subsidies provided for the construction and operation of the arena and the 
revenue from the AAA that benefits the local jurisdiction. The way the arena generates 
economic benefits for the county is by returning a share of the revenue at the arena to the 
county (which would not occur under normal business conditions) and by generating 
incremental revenue from spending by new non-local fans. The methods for this 
calculation and the sources of such data are described. Particular attention must be 
devoted to the geographic and commercial context of fan spending to properly estimate 
the non-local fan base. The second part examines the employment impact of the AAA by 
accounting for the dynamics in which incremental revenue attributable to the presence of 
the AAA translates into new employment opportunities for local workers. The methods 
used to account for the substitution effect and revenue leakage are outlined and the 
methods used to estimate the number of jobs created by the incremental revenue is 
described. Finally, the limitations of this research are considered.  
  
Input-Output Framework  
The total subsidy provided for the AAA consists of direct and indirect payments 
guaranteed by the public-private contract but also from infrastructure investments and 
foregone tax revenue. An understanding of the public and private sector contributions to 
the new arena was gleaned from the various legal contracts between the county, the 
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Miami Heat, and Basketball Properties Limited (BPL), the arena manager, known 
collectively as the Related Agreements (1997). Information was also gathered from the 
Purchase Agreement (1997) between Miami-Dade county and the City of Miami, which 
secured the purchase of the waterfront land (Maritime Park) on which the arena was built 
and from various local and state government websites. Information on infrastructure 
expenditures was gleaned from newspaper sources and from the City of Miami’s list of 
Major Use Special Projects (MUSP, 2005).  
The direct public sector contribution to the AAA comes from direct payments 
made to the arena manager to offset the cost of daily operations and municipal services. 
Infrastructure investment made to facilitate arena traffic includes roadway improvements 
and the construction of a nearby parking garage which serves downtown workers and 
students, as well as arena patrons. The arena manager receives an annual sales tax rebate 
from the state which is paid independent of taxes collected on arena sales. The purchase 
of the land on which the arena is built and the debt service on the old Miami Arena are 
also part of the subsidy. The final source of the public’s contribution to the AAA comes 
in the form of property tax revenues that will not be collected by the relevant city of 
Miami taxing authorities, including the board of education and the children’s trust, whose 
levies are the largest (Miami-Dade Property Appraiser, 2005). 22 The total millage rate is 
26.74, which is collected on every $1000. The foregone property taxes are calculated by 
                                                     
22 Since the Maritime Park property has always been publicly owned, property taxes have never been 
collected on it. Thus, it might seem unreasonable to consider the foregone revenue from property taxes a 
public subsidy for the AAA project. However, the property is privately used and the arena is an exclusive 
building, restricting public access to a greater degree than parks, libraries or museums. Furthermore, 
insomuch as traditional economic development strategies typically provide subsidies for companies 
building on privately owned land, the foregone tax revenue from the Maritime Park property accounts for 
the value of an alternative form of economic development on the same site.  
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applying this rate and assuming a conservative rate of property value appreciation of 15 
percent.23  
Miami-Dade County may directly receive revenues from the arena through the 
revenue sharing agreement with the arena manager as well as a surcharge on parking for 
basketball games. To estimate the county’s share of revenues the arena’s net income over 
30 years must be estimated. However, this is extremely difficult given the variability of 
most of the arena’s sources of income and expenses. Nonetheless, various scenarios can 
be considered and applied to the largest sources of income and expenses to determine a 
range of possible outcomes for revenue sharing with the county. Audit reports for the first 
five years of the arena’s operation were obtained, thereby revealing the arena’s sources of 
income and expenses as well as the county’s share of the arena’s net operating income 
thus far. Included in the arena’s net income is a use fee paid by the Miami Heat, retail 
fees paid by arena tenants, revenue from the sale of luxury suites, revenue from the sale 
of the arena naming rights, revenue from parking, concessions and arena restaurants and 
other smaller sources income and expenses related to operations and maintenance. The 
largest revenue stream generated by the arena, admission ticket receipts, is captured fully 
by the team. The authors’ estimates of various revenue streams were adjusted according 
to the figures for the first five years of the arena’s operation given in the audit reports. 
Gross income for the arena was estimated using data on attendance, the cost of 
concessions, luxury seating, parking and the other revenues listed above. Net operating 
income for the arena was estimated by accounting for expenses, including arena (not 
                                                     
23 The value of the property has increased from $38 million in 1998 to $133.6 million in 2005 (Miami-Dade 
Property Appraiser, 2005), which is reflects annual appreciation of about 19.5 percent. Thus, 15 percent 
appears to be very conservative rate.   
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Miami Heat) payroll, operations and maintenance, and debt service on the corporate 
bonds used to finance the arena construction. The team’s net income was estimated as 
well in order to infer the value of the new facility to the team compared to its value to the 
public.  
Attendance data for the American Airlines Arena was gathered from multiple 
sources, including a website dedicated to professional basketball statistics,24  Fox Sports 
and ESPN. Information on average spending at basketball games was provided by staff at 
BPL and estimates from Fox Sports, and Team Marketing Research (TMR). Before-and-
after game spending was estimated using price data from TMR and data from other cost-
benefit research (Rappaport and Wilkerson, 2001; Hamilton and Kahn, 1997). Spending 
at other events at the arena were estimated using data from the AAA website and from an 
impact study of a proposed downtown arena in Sacramento, California  (Sacramento 
Study, n.d.). Estimates of “other expenses” for the Miami Heat were gleaned form Forbes 
magazine’s list of individual NBA team valuations for the 2000-01, 2003-04 and 2004-05 
basketball seasons and inferred for other seasons based on changes in payroll. Payroll 
expenses were obtained from baskteballreference.com, USA Today magazine and Sports 
Business News. Estimates of revenue from sponsorship, advertising, television network 
agreements and luxury seats were adopted from various newspaper sources and a 
personal communication with a researcher and staff writer at Forbes Magazine.   
An important methodological step precedes the analysis of employment impacts: 
the definition of the local geographic unit. In this case, the definition of “local” has 
important implications for the proportion of fans considered to be non-local and thus 
                                                     
24 See www.basketballreference.com 
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implications for the estimated increment in visitor fan attendance at the AAA. Moreover, 
in light of the theories of Santo (2005) and Nelson (2001) which predict that downtown 
sports facilities impart a greater economic impact, the commercial and planning context 
of the AAA was considered. The geography of southeast Florida tourism and the 
commercial characteristics of the arena’s environs were also considered in order to 
estimate the magnitude of visitor fan spending induced by the AAA.  
 
Geographic Considerations  
The magnitude of economic impact depends heavily on the geographic boundary 
of analysis. At the national level all spending on professional basketball is a substitution 
of spending at other venues; that is, it crowds out spending elsewhere in the country (Noll 
and Zimbalist, 1997). At the local level, however, this need not be the case. Spending in 
Miami-Dade County may replace spending in Broward or another county. If fans from 
another county in Florida spend more money in Miami-Dade than they would have 
otherwise spent closer to home, then the revenue from their spending represents a gain 
for Miami-Dade and a loss for the other county. 
As this analysis purports to measure the impact of the AAA on local taxpayers, 
the logical definition of “local” would be Miami-Dade County, implying that non-locals 
reside outside of Miami-Dade. Defining the local/non-local boundary along county lines 
suggests that the spending of basketball fans from other counties, such as Broward, is 
“new money” and thus beneficial for Miami-Dade county. The geographic perspective on 
fan spending reveals that this is not the case in southeast Florida. It cannot be assumed 
that the spending of fans from Broward County substitutes spending they would have 
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done in their home county rather than Miami-Dade. Given the importance of Miami-
Dade as a recreation destination, in particular the cities of Miami and Miami Beach, it is 
plausible that the spending of fans from other counties at the AAA crowds out spending 
they would have done in Miami-Dade anyway. This is likely to be true for fans from the 
Ft. Lauderdale area, Miami’s northern neighbor, who have easy access to Miami-Dade’s 
downtown and ocean-front venues.25 Most of Broward-based fan spending is therefore 
likely to represent a realignment of spending in Miami-Dade.  
One might also argue that when the Florida Panthers of the National Hockey 
League (NHL) moved from the Miami Arena to Broward’s Office Depot Center (ODC) 
they took their hockey fan base with them. In this way, some part of Broward’s Miami 
Heat fan base that would represent visitor spending if we drew the local/non-local 
boundary at the county line is offset by hockey fans from Miami visiting the ODC. In 
economic terms, Broward and Miami-Dade counties’ subsidies for professional sports 
facilities have generated positive externalities for each other. Even though Miami-Dade 
taxpayers have subsidized Broward-based fan consumption benefits from the Miami 
Heat, Broward taxpayers have subsidized the consumption benefits of Miami’s hockey 
fans. The substitution effect of Broward-based fan spending at the AAA and the offset of 
these fans by Miami-based hockey fans suggests that the majority of Broward-based fan 
spending should not be counted as new money. With a population of 1.7 million in 2003 
(American Community Survey [ACS], 2003), Broward likely supplies the second-
greatest number of AAA patrons (after Miami-Dade). Thus, the reduction of the total 
                                                     
25 Broward residents’ commute to downtown Miami or Miami Beach is shorter than that of fans driving 
from the southern parts of Miami-Dade County (e.g., Homestead).   
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estimated fan spending amount by the proportion attributable to Broward-based fans is 
substantial.  
The third largest source of AAA patrons is likely to be fans from Palm Beach 
County, a population of 1.2 million in 2003 (ACS, 2003). Palm Beach is far enough away 
so that many of its basketball fans are not as likely to do their entertainment spending in 
Miami-Dade in the absence of the AAA. Palm Beach fan spending is therefore assumed 
to represent new money for Miami-Dade County. Insomuch as these assumptions 
overstate the impact of Palm Beach fans spending and understate the impact of Broward 
fan spending, these errors are thought to approximately offset each other.  
On the other hand, there are reasons for defining local and non-local fans along 
county lines. Part of the hidden rationale for subsidizing the arena was to prevent Miami 
Heat and Carnival Cruise owner Mickey Arison from taking his business to Fort 
Lauderdale (Foreman, 2003). Broward would have gained two new professional 
franchises and at least a few of Arison’s cruise ships and the corresponding benefits from 
increased tourism in the worst case scenario for Miami. Therefore, the most appropriate 
analysis should compare the impact of incremental visitor fan spending under both 
assumptions: (1) Broward fan spending represents a realignment of fan spending within 
Miami-Dade County and therefore only the spending of visitors from outside the 
Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Area (CMSA) is beneficial; (2) the spending of all 
fans that reside outside of Miami-Dade County represents money gained for the county. 
In the absence of information indicating the proportion of AAA patrons that reside in 
Broward, in Palm Beach, or elsewhere, this analysis assumes that a considerable share of 
the Miami Heat’s non-local fan base is from Broward because of its size and proximity, 
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with a somewhat smaller percentage residing in Palm Beach and the smallest slice from 
elsewhere in the state or country. Fifteen percent of fans at the AAA are assumed to 
reside in Palm Beach and an additional 5 percent in the rest of the state or country, for a 
total of 20 percent of AAA patrons that are thought to reside outside of the Dade-
Broward CMSA. This figure is referred to as the CMSA-based definition of the non-local 
fan base. An additional 30 percent of Heat fans likely reside in Broward County; hence, 
50 percent of fans are thought to reside outside of Miami-Dade County. This figure 
represents the MSA-based definition of the non-local fan base. These figures were used 
to estimate incremental revenue from non-local fan spending and the corresponding 
respective number of jobs created under each assumption.  
 
Commercial Context and the Attendance Increment  
A question remains to be answered regarding the extent to which the new arena 
has attracted incremental non-local fans above that which is accounted for by greater 
seating capacity. That is, is the new arena more attractive than the old one, thereby 
enticing more non-local fans? The commercial context in which the AAA was developed 
and the impact of the new facility on overall attendance rates provide clues with which to 
formulate a response to the last question.  
The commercial context in which the facility was built suggests that it was not 
planned so as to attract tourists and other non-local visitors. As reviewed in chapter III, 
the economic impact of public-private partnerships to build sports facilities may be 
positively enhanced by a more carefully crafted development strategy (Santo, 2005; 
Nelson, 2001). The AAA in Miami is a case in which the new facility was not integrated 
77 
 
into a commercial context that would facilitate dramatic changes in visitor fan attendance 
and spending, despite being located in the downtown area. It is useful to consider this by 
way of a contrast. In Baltimore, Maryland, a new baseball stadium was built into the 
commercial and architectural fabric of the neighborhood’s tourist destinations, resulting 
in a 70 percent increase in non-local fans (Friedman, Andrews and Silk 2004; Hamilton 
and Kahn 1997). Hamilton and Kahn (1997) describe the context in which the new 
facility in Baltimore was planned. 
 
The thinking among planners was that the Camden yards site would attract fans 
from throughout the Baltimore/Washington area both because of easy access and 
because of the other attractions at the Inner Harbor. The basic rationale for 
selecting the site was that the presence of multiple attractions would induce 
more attendance both at Orioles games and other downtown attractions than 
either could generate in the absence of the other. (p. 253) 
 
The inner harbor in Baltimore was redeveloped into a thriving commercial and 
cultural center between the 1970’s and the 1990’s. By the time the new baseball stadium 
was built in 1992 the adjacent streets were comprised of a number of museums, historical 
parks and landmarks, restaurants, bars and other commercial and tourist attractions 
emphasizing the history and culture of the city (Friedman, Andrews and Silk, 2004). At 
the intersection of major interstate highways and the two major local rail systems, the 
location of the new facility was optimal for attracting non-local fans (Hamilton and Kahn, 
1997). Moreover, other observers have noted that the new ballpark in Baltimore is 
structurally configured such that it blends in with the overall aesthetic quality of the Inner 
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Harbor, contributing to its success as a tourist attraction (Friedman, Andrews and Silk, 
2004).   
The case of the AAA in Miami is dramatically different. Miami’s new arena was 
one of the first large-scale entertainment amenities to be added to central city and was not 
part of a long-term plan for downtown economic revitalization. Rather, sudden 
developments in local business relations and changes in the formal structure of local 
government stimulated public and private sector leaders to collaborate for the purpose of 
building a new sports facility with public funds (Foreman, 2003). The only commercial 
attraction that existed prior to the AAA’s construction was Bayside Marketplace, an 
outdoor shopping and entertainment complex facing the bay. The other major nearby 
attraction is Parrot Jungle, built in 2003, which has been unable to generate profits in its 
first two years of operation. The trendy and upscale Bongo’s Cuban Café is located on 
the waterfront side of the arena property and may attract a few fans interested in a drink 
and dancing after a game but is more likely to discourage non-local attendance because of 
its high prices. The adjacent Performing Arts Center is still under construction, while 
nearby many vacant and “blighted” properties remain as eyesores rather than tourist 
attractions. Furthermore, the explicit purpose of the new facility was to generate more 
revenue from luxury suites (virtually all of which are sold to locals), not attract visitors.  
As mentioned before, no data is available that indicates the residential address of 
AAA patrons. While the precise proportion of non-local attendance cannot be 
determined, the sudden and early arrival of the AAA in the overall downtown 
development strategy suggests that at least in its first years of existence, the new facility 
does not attract non-local fans and generate spillover spending above that which occurred 
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at the former arena. Additional insight into the arena’s popularity was gleaned from 
examining its impact on attendance at Miami Heat basketball games.  
 
Table 2. Miami Heat Attendance Change and Win Percentage 
Miami Heat Attendance and Performance Attendance Change 
Season Average Game 
Percent 
of 
Capacity 
Win 
Percent 
Annual 
(Miami) 
Since 
1990 
(Miami) 
Annual 
(NBA) 
Since 
1990 
(NBA) 
2004-05 19,882 99.40% 72% 30.46% 1.52% 14.79% 33.03%
2003-04 15,239 76.20% 51% -0.55% 1.04% 13.06% 1.97% 
2002-03 15,323 76.60% 31% -4.17% -0.49% 11.90% 2.53% 
2001-02 15,989 80.00% 44% -3.34% 1.12% 12.45% 6.99% 
2000-01 16,541 82.70% 61% -4.12% -0.55% 11.20% 10.68%
1999-00* 17,252 86.30% 63% 13.85% 0.79% 11.81% 15.44%
1998-99 15,153 99.70% 66% 1.04% -2.21% 10.94% 1.39% 
1997-98 14,997 98.70% 67% -0.05% 0.23% 13.45% 0.35% 
1996-97 15,004 98.70% 74% 1.49% -1.01% 13.18% 0.39% 
1995-96 14,783 97.30% 51% 1.23% 3.14% 14.34% -1.08% 
1994-95 14,604 96.10% 39% -3.00% 2.96% 10.86% -2.28% 
1993-94 15,055 99.10% 51% 0.38% 1.16% 7.67% 0.74% 
1992-93 14,998 98.70% 44% 0.22% 2.36% 6.44% 0.35% 
1991-92 14,965 98.50% 46% -0.29% 2.91% 3.98% 0.13% 
1990-91 15,008 98.70% 29%% 0.01% -2.84% 1.04% 0.42% 
1989-90 15,006 98.70% 22% 0.41% 3.99% 3.99% 0.41% 
1988-89 14,945 98.30% 18%     
 * In the 1999-00 basketball season a portion of the games were played at the Miami Arena, such that 
192,841 fans attended Heat games at the Miami Arena and 514,484 attended games at the AAA.    
 
If it were the case that the new arena had a positive impact on attendance rates 
independent of team performance or attendance trends throughout the league, then it 
would be reasonable to assume that the new arena was more attractive to basketball fans 
and may entice a greater proportion of non-local fans than the old arena. Table 2 presents 
the attendance figures and win percentage for the Miami Heat at the new and old arenas, 
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as well as average attendance for the NBA. Comparing the last four years at the Miami 
Arena with the first four years at the AAA,26 total attendance increased by about 70,000 
fans per year. However, ignoring 2005, the attendance increase shrinks to 37,979, or 
about 926 fans per game.  
The 2003-04 basketball season was marked by the arrival of star player Shaquille 
O’Neal in Miami and an impressive team performance which carried the Heat to the 
playoffs for the first time in several years. The Heat built on their successful season in 
2004-05, when they fell one game short of qualifying for the NBA Championship series. 
Graph 1 (below) illustrates that while there was a moderate increase in attendance at the 
new arena in 2000 when it opened, this novelty effect wore off by the next season, much 
earlier than is typical for new sports facilities (Coates and Humphreys, 2003). 
Throughout the 1990’s the Miami Arena enjoyed near capacity attendance rates 
regardless of the team’s win-loss record. With the exception of the brief spike in 
popularity following the move to the AAA, Heat attendance at the new arena seems to be 
related more to the team’s performance than the move to the new arena or overall league 
trends.  
                                                     
26 The 1999-00 season is excluded because attendance was affected by the team moving from the old to the 
new arena. While the 1998-99 NBA season was cut in half by labor disputes, attendance rates for the games 
that were played at the Miami Arena were apparently unaffected. However, this year is also excluded from 
the attendance comparison since annual attendance was substantially reduced.  
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Graph 1. NBA and Miami Heat Annual Attendance Change 1989-2005
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The attendance trends indicate that the construction of a new facility is not the 
reason for the increase in attendance at the AAA compared to the Miami Arena. Rather, 
the greater number of patrons at the new facility is related to greater seating capacity and 
the recent success of the team. By contrast, the former arena seems to have attracted fans 
regardless of the team’s record. Thus, this analysis assumes that the proportion of non-
local fans at the AAA is the same as at the former Miami Arena. The total number of 
visitor fans increased in relation to the seating capacity of the new facility and is 
estimated as a proportion of actual total attendance at the AAA following the move.   
 
Measuring Job Creation 
As previously discussed, the basic way in which economic benefits accrue to a 
local metropolitan area is through the importation of professional sports consumption by 
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non-local fans (a rise in exports) (Rappaport and Wilkerson, 2001; Hamilton and Kahn, 
1997; Baade, 1997). New jobs are created both directly through incremental non-local fan 
spending at the new arena and the surrounding neighborhood and indirectly by the 
county-wide ripple effects of such spending (Fort, 2003; Howard and Crompton, 1995; 
Noll and Zimbalist, 1997).  
In the case of the American Airlines Arena, there are two basic sources of 
incremental revenue that may contribute to net job creation. The first is incremental 
revenue from sales generated because the new arena hosts more non-local fans than the 
old arena. As established in the previous section, the additional visitor fans are mainly 
accounted for by the greater seating capacity of the AAA. A portion of the incremental 
local income generated by non-local fan spending will be reinvested in the local 
workforce, thereby creating new jobs. The second source of incremental revenue is from 
taxes collected at the new arena which is re-spent locally by the county, also leading to 
new employment opportunities and income. Sales tax is the only source of tax revenue 
generated by the AAA. Miami-Dade County imposes a local sales tax rate of 1 percent 
and receives a portion of the state’s tax receipts, collected as 6 percent of taxable sales. 
While the formula that determines the county’s share of state tax receipts is not available, 
since 2000 the county has received between 12 and 13 percent of annual sales tax receipts 
for the state (Florida Sales Tax Receipts, 2000-2004). Thus, 13 percent is a reasonable, 
conservative (optimistic) estimate of the county’s share of state sales tax receipts.   
To isolate the sales and tax revenue that represents a gain for the county and that 
remains and re-circulates throughout the local economy, the revenue from the spending 
of local fans should not be considered (Baade, 2000; Noll and Zimbalist, 1997; Howard 
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and Crompton, 1995). Further, only non-local fan spending above that which would have 
occurred at the old arena represents new money for the county. Incremental revenue is 
estimated by subtracting the average annual spending of non-local fans over the first five 
full seasons of basketball at the new arena from the average of the last five full seasons of 
basketball at the old arena. Sources of revenue considered include gate receipts, estimated 
spending on parking and concessions and estimated spending outside the arena on retail 
shopping, food and entertainment.  
Assuming that every third arena patron spends the listed 25 dollars for parking, 
the average parking cost per fan is $8.33. This estimate is quite generous since cheaper 
parking (as low as $5) is available, albeit at a greater distance from the arena, and since 1 
in 3 may also be an optimistic estimate of the number of fans paying for parking 
(Rappaport and Wilkerson, 2001). TMR estimates that typical spending at an NBA game 
for a family of four, not including parking, consists of two beers, four soft drinks, four 
hot dogs or other food items, two event programs and two novelty items (TMR, 2004). 
Independent observers have suggested that the actual spending of fans at sporting events 
is much less (Rappaport and Wilkerson, 2001; Hudson, 2001). Accounting for the prices 
of these items at the AAA, this analysis assumes that the average fan spends $10 on 
concessions at the arena. Ten dollars at the AAA is enough to purchase at least one 
beverage and one food item.27  
Visiting fans also spend money in the environs of the arena. Staff members at the 
nearest hotel to the AAA (The Holiday Inn) indicated that out-of-state fans attending 
Miami Heat playoff games in 2005 likely spent between $50 and $60, on average, during 
                                                     
27 Based on data from TMR and information provided by a guest services staff member at the AAA.   
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their one night stay in the downtown area. Rappaport and Wilkerson (2001) estimate that 
average non-local fan spending at NBA games is $33 (p. 67), but their estimate also 
assumes a greater proportion of out-of-state fans than is the norm for the Miami Heat. 
Staff at the moderately priced Holiday Inn indicated that during the regular season (not 
including the playoffs) they host virtually no out-of-state fans. The vast majority of 
regular season visiting basketball fans are likely to be in-state and live within driving 
distance of the arena.28 These fans are less likely to spend as much money in Miami as 
out-of-state fans since they may have eaten dinner at home or may not want to spend 
more money since they must pay for the fuel cost of their commute to and from the arena. 
Further, if they are not staying in a hotel and have to drive home late at night they may 
similarly choose not to stay in the environs of the AAA after the game. These various 
considerations suggest that average visitor fan spending in the case of Miami-Dade may 
be substantially less than the estimates of Rappaport and Wilkerson for the NBA overall. 
Thus, it is assumed that non-local AAA patrons spend an average of $20 before and after 
attending a basketball game in Miami-Dade. This accounts for the tendency of some fans 
to spend large amounts of money while others may spend nothing and drive home 
immediately after the game.  
The AAA hosts other events in addition to professional basketball. However, it is 
not assumed that the AAA attracts more non-local fans to non-basketball events than the 
Miami Arena did since increased seating capacity (from 15 to 20 thousand) bears no 
effect on events that would not normally seat more than 12 thousand spectators, such as 
                                                     
28 Dade, Broward and Palm Beach County are the only three large metropolitan populations in south 
Florida. While a small number of fans may drive from the Florida Keys to see Heat games, it is unlikely 
that a considerable proportion of Heat fans would come from outside the Tri-county area during the regular 
season.  
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concerts, the circus, ice shows, and the like. While the AAA generates considerable 
revenue from the spending of fans at non-basketball events, this is not likely to represent 
a significant increase from that which occurred at the former arena. Thus, it is assumed 
that no new money is imported through the spending of patrons at non-basketball events.  
Incremental revenue from new spending creates local jobs as the rising demand 
for exports (reflected by the importation of sales and tax revenue) increases the city’s 
demand for labor (Hamilton and Kahn, 1997; Zimmerman, 1997). To determine the 
number of new jobs created, the amount of revenue from the direct new spending that is 
re-spent on the costs of local labor was estimated. It is reasonable to expect that labor’s 
share of the income generated from fan spending at the arena is no greater than the share 
of the total income generated from county-wide sales that is used to cover employment 
costs.29 In order to calculate labor’s share of income in Miami-Dade County, the 
employment cost for all workers in 2003 was divided by the county’s total income for the 
same year. Hence, labor’s share of income in Miami-Dade County is about 55.3 
percent.30   
Not all of the induced spending at the AAA impacts local employment in the 
same way. Additional factors intervene to reduce labor’s share of the revenue generated 
within the confines of the AAA. Like that which is generated outside the AAA, a portion 
of the revenue generated inside the arena is spent on the wages or salaries and benefits of 
local workers. However, more of the incremental revenue generated inside the AAA is 
                                                     
29 This is a conservative (optimistic) estimate since labor’s share of the income generated in the sectors of 
the economy that typically absorb tourist dollars is likely to be lower than that of the economy overall. For 
example, average wages and hours worked are lower in the retail and service sectors than the average for 
all economic sectors (BLS, 2000-2004).  
 
30 $35,659,420,624 (QCEW, 2003) / $64,460,780,000 (BEA, 2003) = 0.553.  
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leaked out of the local economy through the salaries of team personnel, including owners, 
managers and players that are likely to spend most of their money outside of the local 
jurisdiction (see chapter III). To account for this leakage, the amount of revenue thought 
to be expended on the costs of local labor was reduced to half of the normal share 
(Hamilton and Kahn, 1997, note 70). To calculate the job increment the average salary of 
the types of jobs created was accounted for. Most of the initial and subsequent rounds of 
visitor spending are likely to take place at retail and service sector establishments 
throughout the Miami metro area, such as restaurants, bars, hotels and retail shopping 
stores. Therefore, to determine the number of new jobs created, labor’s share of the 
incremental revenue was divided by the average salary of workers in these employment 
sectors.  
The final step involves the application of the employment multiplier to account 
for the impact of new income captured by county government, business owners and 
workers that is subsequently expended in the local economy. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, a number of factors influence the ripple effects of job creation, most notably the 
unemployment rate. In 2000, unemployment in Miami-Dade was at a low point (US 
Census, 2000). It had been declining for at least five years and rose again in subsequent 
years. This enhances the possibility that any job creation resulting from new fan spending 
induced by the AAA replaces jobs elsewhere in the local economy. Therefore, the ripple 
effects of new jobs created should be relatively small. Consistent with the methods of 
similar research (Rappaport and Wilkerson, 2001; Hamilton and Kahn, 1997) and 
considering the multiplier values typically employed in promotional studies, ranging 
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from 1.5 to 2.5 (Howard and Crompton, 1995),31 this analysis assumes an employment 
multiplier value of 1.2. In other words, every job created from incremental visitor fan 
spending induced by the AAA results 0.2 additional jobs as the initial new workers spend 
money in the local economy.  
 
Limitations of the Study.  
 Like any cost-benefit analysis, this research must make certain assumptions in the 
absence of reliable data. The most significant assumption made is that of the non-local 
fan base. The exact proportion or number of non-local fans at the AAA could not be 
ascertained. Similarly, the motivations behind non-local fans visit to the AAA were not 
determined, thus the proportion of non-local fans that are casuals or time-switchers is not 
known. As discussed above, reasonable assumptions were made by taking into 
consideration the commercial context in which the arena was built and the geographic 
context of fan spending in southeast Florida. Moreover, considering the data available for 
non-local fan attendance at other professional sports facilities throughout the United 
States and the geographic and commercial context of fan spending at those facilities 
compared to South Florida, the assumptions made in this analysis are conservative 
(optimistic) in the sense that they likely overstate the non-local fan base. In general, all of 
the assumptions made in this analysis (with the exception of the multiplier value) are also 
conservative in the sense of making optimistic predictions of the AAA’s economic 
impact. As such, the findings of this analysis represent a best case scenario of the benefits 
the county can expect to receive from the AAA. The next chapter applies the assumptions 
                                                     
31 Multiplier values of 1.5 or higher are likely to exaggerate the ripple effects of job creation (Howard and 
Crompton, 1995; Hudson, 2001).  
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and methods outlined above in order to estimate the costs and benefits of the American 
Airlines Arena to county taxpayers.  
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Chapter V 
Findings 
 
In this chapter the net fiscal cost or benefit to the county is estimated and the 
employment impact of the new arena is measured in terms of the number of full-time jobs 
created at the average salary of retail and service sector workers. The first section of the 
chapter describes the financial arrangements between the AAA and Miami-Dade County 
and reports the corresponding fiscal costs and benefits to the county. The second section 
presents the county’s net fiscal balance from the public-private partnership over the 30 
year term of the contract. The final section measures the employment impacts of the 
AAA, accounting for revenue leakage, the substitution effect of fan spending and the 
opportunity cost of the public investment.  
The plan to build the arena was negotiated in 1996-97 between county 
representatives, the Miami Heat, and Basketball Properties Limited (BPL), the 
management company. What set this deal apart from most other public-private 
partnerships in professional sports is that the Heat franchise was required to finance the 
construction of the arena without public support. This was not as substantial a 
compromise as public officials proclaimed since taxpayer dollars covered virtually all 
other expenses related to the construction and operation of the new arena, including the 
acquisition and preparation of the land, roadway and other infrastructure improvements, 
and additional subsidies in the form of operating payments and foregone tax revenue.  
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The Public-Private Partnership.  
The county’s contribution to the construction and operation of the AAA are 
various and complex. The county makes annual operating cost and municipal service 
payments totaling $6.5 million for each year of the contract except the last one, when the 
payment will only be $1.5 million. In addition, in 1998 and 1999 the county paid the 
Team $5 million to cover start-up operating costs and municipal services (BPL Audit 
Report, 2000). These payments total $196.9 million over the 30-year term of the 
agreement. In addition, the county purchased 17 acres of Maritime Park on which the 
arena was built from the City with bonds worth about $42 million in interest and 
principle over 20 years (Purchase Agreement, 1997).  
Investment in local infrastructure to facilitate increased traffic due to the stadium 
must also be considered as part of the subsidy. The county is obligated to pay up to $1.8 
million in roadway improvements related to the development of the Parcel B retail 
complex (Composite Amendment Two, 1999). Although information was not available 
indicating that this amount has been expended, numerous improvements have been made 
to the roadways surrounding the arena since it opened. In 1998 the county built a new 
$28 million parking garage for Miami-Dade College on which it collects a $2 surcharge 
for spaces used by Miami Heat fans on game nights (City of Miami MUSP List, 2005). 
While the explicit purpose of the parking garage is to serve the community college, it is 
heavily used by arena patrons on game nights as well.  
Tax breaks must also be included in order to estimate the “real” cost of a public-
private partnership (Long, 2005; LeRoy and Hinkley, 2002). The AAA receives a state 
sales tax rebate which is set at a fixed rate. The Arena manager receives an approximately 
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$2 million annual rebate apart from the taxes it pays on sales at the arena (BPL Audit 
Reports, 2000-2004). The arena is also exempt from paying local property taxes since it 
is owned by the county. In private hands the property would have yielded about $18.7 
million at 19.5 percent appreciation and $8.9 million at 15 percent appreciation over 30 
years at the millage rate established by the relevant local taxing authorities (see notes 22 
and 23 above). In other words, the AAA receives an almost $69 million subsidy ([$2m X 
30 years] + $8.9m) in the form of sales and property tax abatements over the term of the 
contract with the county. 
The Miami Heat and other tenants contribute to the facility’s construction and 
operation in a few ways. To fund the construction of the arena Micky Arison, owner of 
the Miami Heat, secured $185 million in fixed-rate bonds placed by Prudential Securities, 
Inc., and insured by MBIA Insurance. Arison used the value of the team to provide $60 
million of collateral and had to guarantee revenue streams from sponsorship and TV 
broadcasting deals (BPL Audit Report, 2001; McEntee, 1998). The Miami Heat pay a use 
fee of $1.5 million annually to play basketball at the AAA and other tenants pay almost 
$1 million in annual retail fees to the arena manager. The combined use and retail fee is 
$1.9 million more than the annual rent at the Miami Arena, although rent at the old arena 
was paid directly to the municipal stadium authority.     
The largest potential source of revenue for the county comes from its’ 40 percent 
share of the arena net revenue above $14 million. Since the arena (independent of the 
team) has incurred net losses in its first five years of operation, the county has received 
nothing from the revenue sharing agreement thus far (BPL Audit Reports, 2000-2005). 
The present inputs and outputs reported in the BPL documents suggest that the county 
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will not be able to earn a share of arena net revenue over the term of the contract. 
However, other observers have predicted that once the arena eliminates its debt service 
(scheduled for 2014) the county will begin to earn money from the partnership (Krischer-
Goodman, 1999). If arena revenues are adjusted so as to rise at a faster rate than arena 
expenses (BPL Audit Reports, 2000-2005), in 2014 the arena will begin to generate 
between $2 and $10 million in annual profits (authors calculations). It is unclear under 
what conditions the arena would be able to generate enough revenue or sufficiently 
decrease its expenses in order to reach the annual $14 million net income threshold above 
which the county would be able to earn its 40 percent share. The largest revenue stream 
accounted for is that of luxury suites which, generating around $14 million, are virtually 
sold out. Player salaries are not part of the arena’s expenses; otherwise selling a few 
players would considerably reduce expenses. Press reports have estimated that the arena 
may share as much as $8 million with the county over thirty years (Krischer-Goodman, 
1999).  
The other two sources of direct revenues to the county are sales tax revenue and a 
$2 surcharge on parking which yields around $278,000 per year counting the estimated 
number of spaces used by Heat fans.32 Revenue from sales taxes collected on spending 
induced by the AAA over 30 years could reach $205 million, but much of this represents 
the substitution of leisure spending elsewhere in the local economy and revenue that is 
redistributed to other parts of the state. Assuming a non-local fan base of 50 percent, 
estimated spending of $38 per fan (including parking, concessions and before-and-after 
game spending), and assuming that the county receives a 13 percent share of state sales 
                                                     
32 Recall that it is optimistically assumed that every third arena patron pays for parking (see chapter III).  
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tax receipts (see chapter III), the local sales tax revenue benefit is $8.75 million. While 
annual rent paid at the AAA is almost $2 million, the county’s portion of this amount is 
negligible. Between 2003 and 2005 the county received just $376,791 in retail fees from 
non-basketball AAA tenants (Retail Fees, 2005). In addition, the county receives $2 
million over 20 years from the sale of the arena naming rights and $500,000 which is 
paid by the team for the development of park space in the surrounding area (Related 
Agreements, 2005).  
The final financial factor to be considered is the continuing cost of the Miami 
Arena. Outstanding arena debts following the construction of the AAA were reported to 
be about $6 million per year (Rabin, 2004; Krischer-Goodman, 2001). However, as of 
2004, the old arena was purchased by a private investor, relieving the City of Miami of 
its’ debt service commitments and putting the arena on the city’s tax rolls (Rabin, 2004). 
Nonetheless, the approximately $24 million in debt service the city paid for the Miami 
Arena since the AAA’s opening must be considered among the public costs of the new 
facility. While the Miami Heat and the Florida Panthers played their home games there, 
the Miami Arena was making money (even though the teams were losing money). For 
example, between 1995 and 2000, the Arena’s most profitable years, net income was just 
over $1 million annually and the City of Miami’s Sports and Exhibition Authority’s 
(MSEA) share of the profits was close to $400,000 (Taylor Seeman, 1998). This 
represented the MSEA’s net income from the Miami Arena after debt service and other 
expenses. Thus, the arena was profitable for the MSEA until the departure of its two 
professional sports franchises, since when it has generated virtually no income for the 
City and cost $24 million in debt payments.  
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At the AAA, the Miami Heat capture all revenues from admission tickets, on-site 
parking, retail merchandise sales at the arena, national and local media sponsorship and 
advertising deals, and other sources of revenue which do not figure into the Arena 
manager’s net income. It is impossible to know the exact income generated by these 
sources since the Miami Heat is a private company that protects the financial details of its 
operations. However, some estimates are available. Forbes magazine estimates that the 
Heat earned about $90 million from all fan spending in each of their first five years of 
operation, with net yearly expenses ranging from $74 to $94 million (Forbes Team 
Valuations, 2005). Annual gate receipts are not a straight-forward calculation, since 
revenue sharing with the league reduces the team’s intake. Forbes Magazine estimates 
that the team’s average annual gate receipts for the years 2002 through 2004 is about $30 
million (Forbes Team Valuations, 2002-2004). According to Forbes, the team’s net 
income was $45.6 million since its move to the new arena (not including 2005).  
 
Net Fiscal Return to Taxpayers.  
What do the aforementioned public and private contributions and revenues mean 
for the taxpayer’s return on their investment in the American Airlines Arena? Table 2 
lists the public subsidies, revenue generated and the resulting fiscal balance from the 
AAA.33 The total subsidy provided to the arena over the 30 year term of the contract is 
$268.7 million, including interest and principal on bonds used to purchase the land, the 
operating and municipal services payments and public infrastructure investments. The 
                                                     
33 Table 2 and the discussion in this section considers the costs (subsidies) and benefits (fiscal return) to 
taxpayers of Miami-Dade County only and does not consider other expenses arguably attributable to the 
construction of the AAA. For a more comprehensive account of costs and benefits see Table 6 in the 
appendix.   
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total revenue generated by the AAA that benefits the county is estimated to be $40.5  
million over 30 years, including the county’s share of arena net revenue, revenue from 
the arena naming rights, the public park fund, tenant retail fees, the surcharge on parking 
and sales taxes collected on incremental non-local fan purchases at the AAA.  
 
Table 3. Net Fiscal Costs and Benefits to Miami-Dade County  
Subsidy and Revenue Sources 30 Year Total 
 Operating And Services Subsidy   $   (196,900,000) 
 Land Subsidy   $     (42,000,000) 
 Roadways Investment   $       (1,800,000) 
 MDC Parking Garage (1998)   $     (28,000,000) 
 Total Subsidy  $   (268,700,000) 
 Direct Naming Rights Surplus   $        2,000,000  
 Park Fund   $          500,000  
 County Share   $                   -    
 Local Sales Tax Revenue (MSA, 40% non-locals)   $      14,968,041  
 Local Sales Tax Revenue (CMSA, 20% non-locals)   $        8,401,830  
 Retail Fees (non-basketball tenants)*   $        6,000,000  
 Revenue From Parking   $        8,642,799  
 Total Return   $      40,512,670  
 Cost/Benefit to Public  $   (228,187,330) 
 
* Miami Heat and Miami Sol use fees ($1.5 million annually) are income for the arena 
manager and considered under “county share” above. However, the Miami Sol are no 
longer tenants at the AAA.  
 
The public cost of subsidizing the Arena far outweighs the fiscal return. Under the 
assumptions mentioned above and accounting for the public cost of the Miami Arena, the 
balance of costs and benefits ranges from losses of $205 million to losses of $329 
million. By contrast, the estimated net operating income of the Team over 30 years at the 
AAA, before debt payments and understating revenue from media and advertising 
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agreements, is estimated at about $283.6 million.34 In addition, the value of the team 
increased from $162 to $225 million following the move, an increase of about 40 %, 
which is greater than the average increase of about 30 % for all other NBA teams that 
moved to a new facility since 1991 (NBA Hoops Online, 2005; Forbes Team Valuations, 
1991-2004).  
The above input-output estimates demonstrate that the share of the revenue 
returned to the county from the new arena is substantially less than the total subsidy over 
the 30 year term of the public-private partnership. Moreover, it appears that the greatest 
beneficiary of the move from a fiscal standpoint is the Miami Heat; its owner, basketball 
players and other personnel. The next section examines the extent to which the estimated 
revenue increment attributable to the new arena has had an economic impact by creating 
new employment opportunities for residents of Miami-Dade County.   
 
The Employment Impact of the American Airlines Arena.   
  Jobs are created from the ripple effects of incremental visitor fan spending 
induced by the AAA. A portion of the non-local fan spending at the AAA simply replaces 
that which would have occurred at the former arena. To analyze the employment impact 
of the AAA the increase in attendance and spending by non-local fans at the new facility 
must be isolated. There is no evidence to suggest that the new arena has been more 
successful in attracting non-local fans than the old arena, although this does not mean it 
has not. One reason to suspect that the AAA underachieves as a tourist attraction is the 
commercial context in which the structure was built and the lack of long-term planning 
                                                     
34 Based on estimates by Forbes and authors own calculations.  
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(see chapter III). The increase in non-local fans corresponds to the increase in available 
seats and depends on the popularity of the new arena as reflected in attendance figures 
over the first five years of its existence.  
Comparing the average of the first five years at the AAA to the average of the last 
five years at the Miami Arena,35 the annual increment in non-local attendance using the 
CMSA-based definition (20 percent non-local attendance) is 13,993. Under the MSA-
based definition in which Broward fans are included in the economic impact (an 
additional 30 percent of total attendance) the non-local attendance increment is 34,982. 
This translates into incremental spending when these spectators purchase tickets, food 
and beverage at the arena, and spend money on restaurants, hotels and other services in 
the local area.  
Since jobs created from the incremental revenue induced by the AAA are likely to 
be created in the service and retail industries serving visitors, the mean income for these 
industries should be used to estimate job creation. Table 4 presents the relevant wage data 
for occupations within these sectors in 2004. While attempting to account for the salary 
of the types of jobs most likely created from increased spending at the AAA is more 
accurate than using the average salary of all industries, it remains a crude measure of 
what the actual annual pay may be in these new jobs. This technique does not account for 
the fact that more jobs may be created in some industries instead of others. For example, 
if jobs are more likely to be created at hotels and restaurants than retail stores, the 
average salary of new jobs would be lower. In the absence of a weighted statistic, taking 
                                                     
35 Excluding the 1999-00 and 1998-99 seasons for the reasons provided in footnote 25.  
98 
 
the average of average salaries within certain industry sectors allows for a more realistic 
estimate of the quality of jobs created from incremental revenue induced by the AAA.  
 
Table 4. Worker Wages for Industries Serving Tourists. 
Industry Title 
Average  
Annual 
Wage Establishments 
Average  
Monthly 
Employment 
Percent of  
Economy 
Retail Trade           $25,127 11,128 115,233 12% 
Leisure and Hospitality  $21,725 5,675 97,872 10% 
Accommodation and  
Food Services  $18,174 4,594 84,776 9% 
Other Services  (except  
public administration)  $23,148 7,697 35,532 4% 
Average of Industry 
Sectors $22,264    
Source: Florida’s Labor Market Statistics, Quarterly Census of Employment & Wages: Miami MSA, 
2004  
 
 
Table 5 presents the estimated spending increments and job creation benefits at 
the new arena. Using the CMSA-based parameter, the annual average revenue increment 
is $3,453,639 from non-local fan spending on admissions tickets, concessions and 
parking, and $8,634,098 under the MSA-based definition. The revenue increment from 
spending outside the arena is $419,780 in the CMSA-based parameter and $699,634 
according to the MSA-based parameter. Finally, the incremental sales tax revenue 
generated by non-local fan spending is $68,346 and $167,487 for the CMSA- and MSA-
based parameters, respectively. 
Revenue from spending within the confines of the sports facility are more likely 
than that which occurs on the outside the arena to leak out of the local economy. Athletes, 
coaches, trainers and other team personnel are more likely than employees outside the 
stadium to spend a greater portion of their income outside the local jurisdiction and the 
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majority of a new facility’s revenue increment is typically devoted to increases in the 
team’s payroll (Hamilton and Kahn, 1997). Indeed, at the AAA, payroll increased $38 
million after the move, which is about 70 percent of the team’s annual revenue increment 
since moving to the AAA.     
 
Table 5. Job Creation Benefit from Incremental Revenue    
  
Spending 
Increment Labor's Share New Jobs Multiplier 
   50% Non-Local Attendance    
Arena Spending  $         8,634,098   $  2,288,036    
Non-Arena Spending  $            699,634   $     370,806    
Tax Revenue   $            167,487   $       88,768    
Total    $  2,747,610  123.41 148.09 
  20% Non-Local Attendance   
Arena Spending  $         3,453,639   $     915,214    
Non-Arena Spending  $            419,780   $     222,484    
Tax Revenue   $              68,346   $       36,224    
Total    $  1,173,922  52.73 63.27 
 
* Calculated by dividing “labor’s share” by 22,264, the average income of workers in Miami’s service and 
retail sectors. 
 
 
Whereas about 55 percent of incremental spending outside the stadium is likely to 
be re-spent on the costs of local labor, only one quarter of that generated within the arena 
should be expected to function in this manner (Hamilton and Kahn, 1997). Proceeding 
according to this reasoning, under the assumption that the non-local fan base is 50 
percent of total attendance, $2.75 million from the aforementioned revenue streams is re-
spent on the salaries and benefits of local workers. If this money goes toward creating 
typical jobs in Miami’s retail and service sectors, approximately 123 jobs may be initially 
created. Having accounted for leakage and the substitution effect by reducing the gross 
revenue amounts to emphasize new spending, an appropriate employment multiplier was 
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applied to estimate the jobs that are created by additional rounds of spending as new 
workers make purchases in the local economy. Using a multiplier value of 1.2, the 123 
new jobs become 148 after subsequent rounds of spending.  
However, recall that the spending of Broward fans, estimated to comprise about 
30 percent of the AAA’s fan base, represents a realignment of fan spending rather than 
new money for Miami-Dade County. Assuming that the visitor fan spending that 
represents incremental revenues for the County is that of fans from outside of Broward 
and Miami-Dade (Palm Beach, the Florida Keys, and further), the proportion of 
incremental non-local fans was reduced to 20 percent. Using this figure and accounting 
for the cost of labor within the relevant service and retail sectors of the economy, the total 
number of new employment opportunities created is about 63. 
In the case of the AAA, Miami-Dade County can expect to lose more than $200 
million over the term of the agreements with the Miami Heat. If the public’s investment 
in the AAA is considered in terms of job creation, each of the 63 new employment 
opportunities is worth about $4.2 million, according to the subsidy total reported in table 
3 above. The cost of creating jobs through local or state economic development programs 
is substantially less. For example, between 2002 and 2003 Miami-Dade County 
facilitated the creation of 1,420 jobs through $1.98 million in property tax exemptions, a 
value of $2,235 per job (EZ Annual Report, 2005). Similar local programs create 
employment opportunities at costs ranging from $1000 to $5000 per job (Beacon 
Council, 2005). The small number of jobs created and the considerable fiscal losses for 
the county demonstrate that the costs of subsidizing the AAA far outweigh the benefits to 
local taxpayers.  
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Chapter VI 
Discussion of Findings 
 
Justifying Public Investments.  
Do the losses reported above mean that the public’s investment in the AAA is not 
justified? Hone (2005) argues that there is another perspective from which public 
investments in entertainment projects may be justified. In the United States subsidies for 
sports facilities are most often justified as a worthwhile investment in an economic 
development project or a boost to civic pride and city image (Curry, Schwirian and 
Woldoff, 2005; Delaney and Eckstein, 2003; Rich, 2000; Noll and Zimbalist, 1997). 
Hone (2005) argues that the impacts of subsidized sports facilities should be analyzed 
according to the information requirements of local planners. In particular, as he argues 
that the purpose of subsidies – independent of their varying political rationales – is to 
intervene in the normal operations of the market, they should be evaluated on these 
grounds (Hone, 2005). If the intervention is thought to improve the efficiency with which 
resources are used in the local economy, then the justification rests on the presence of 
market failures (Hone, 2005, p. 4).  
One market impediment to private sector investment in new sports facilities is the 
inability to capture all the goods produced by sports facilities. Professional sports 
produce “positive externalities” that may be captured by businesses and fans that did not 
contribute to the acquisition of the new facility through tax dollars or otherwise (e.g., a 
free rider problem) (Hone, 2005, p. 5; Fort, 2003). Leagues have responded to this 
problem by using their cartel structure to ensure that new or relocating teams obtain 
favorable lease agreements and build arenas that more completely capture fans’ spending 
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(Rosentraub, 1997). These developments make it unlikely that the free rider problem 
would deter private sector actors from investing in sports facilities since leagues and team 
owners are increasingly guaranteed to reap the vast majority of the profits generated by 
new sports facilities.   
Another market impediment has to do with “divergences in discount rates,” 
(Hone, 2005, p. 6), which refers to the fact that different types of investors have different 
expectations of the time it should take for benefits to accrue from an investment. Hone 
(2005) argues that “private investors may well have a shorter planning horizon (or high 
discount rate) than society as a whole” (p. 6) and therefore may be reluctant to invest in 
professional sports facilities. Thus, the project of interest may not be carried out without 
government intervention.  
Since so many local governments have given in to the demands of team owners 
for subsidized stadiums in the United States (leaving few examples of what happens in 
the opposite situation), the significance of the market impediments identified by Hone is 
not clear. However, in a few of cases where subsidies were not provided, team owners 
have creatively fashioned the needed resources to build state-of-the-art facilities (Baade, 
2003; Rich, 2000). One example is St. Louis, where the Rams were able to use 
guaranteed revenue from personal seat licenses (PSLs) to independently finance one of 
the most expensive domed football stadiums ever built, only after failing to gain financial 
support from the public sector (Keating, 1999). While St. Louis is heralded as the most 
successful example of a privately financed sports facility, Joe Robbie also used PSLs to 
finance a new stadium for the Miami Dolphins in 1987 after being unable to raise funds 
from the public sector.   
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  In the case of professional sports facilities, it seems unlikely that market 
impediments would deter the private sector from investing in new stadiums and arenas. 
Indeed, the evidence suggests that the demand among urban business and civic elites 
(independent of the desires of public officials) is sufficiently strong to ensure the 
construction of a new facility with or without public support (Curry, Schwirian and 
Woldoff, 2004; Delaney and Eckstein, 2003; Rich, 2000; Keating, 1999; Shropshire, 
1995). Nevertheless, the public sector has increasingly become involved in building and 
operating sports facilities, either through pressure from the private sector, of its own 
volition or, more commonly, through a combination of both. In light of the findings of the 
Miami case, the public’s investment in sports facilities is not justified on the basis of 
market failures.  
Arison may have made subtle threats to leave but it is unlikely that he would have 
moved his business away from the largest vacation seaport in the world (Beacon Council, 
2005). Moreover, it is likely he would have settled for a less extravagant and less costly 
facility as long as he could increase the team’s income through revenues from luxury 
suites and other up-scale amenities within the arena’s confines. His ability to privately 
finance the high cost of the AAA’s construction suggests that he may have easily 
financed a greater portion of the overall cost had the facility not been so expensive.36 This 
would have reduced the county’s share of the costs and reduced the county’s losses over 
the term of the contract.  
Miami’s own tendency toward extravagance and public officials’ willingness to 
pay also contributed to the high cost of the arena and the lack of benefits to local 
                                                     
36 The overall cost of the AAA’s construction was reported to be from $200 to $220 million.  
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taxpayers. The abruptness and secrecy in which the decision to subsidize the facility was 
made evaded the public’s involvement until voter approval was needed and could be 
manipulated by a freshly elected charismatic mayor with important social ties to the 
community. In other words, the lack of a public planning process meant that local elites 
would reap the benefits while taxpayers carry the burden.  
The argument that Miamians receive considerable non-economic benefits is weak 
since the Miami Heat would have remained south Florida’s professional basketball team 
even if they moved to Broward. The extent to which the loss of the Heat to Broward 
would have reduced civic pride in Miami or the city’s image is not clear since the move 
would not have carried the team far enough away to affect television viewership, likely 
the largest source of non-economic benefits. Moreover, in the context of the increasing 
emphasis on building regional political and economic ties, the image of southeast Florida 
would have remained intact. Indeed, local elites seemed to be the only ones with 
something to lose in the way of pride and reputation.  
 
Non-Economic Costs.  
Just as tourist spending has ripple effects on the community so do the economic 
losses imposed by the arena subsidy. Dade County Board of Education, the Children’s 
Trust and other local taxing authorities forego scarce funds (property tax revenues) 
because a private business was allowed to reap large profits through its use of public 
property. Moreover, taxpayers’ willingness to pay for construction projects is thought to 
have a certain threshold above which public officials find it difficult to raise taxes 
(Eisinger, 2000, p. 325). The annual operating subsidy paid to the arena limits the 
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county’s budgetary flexibility as it becomes increasingly politically unfeasible to make 
other large public investments, regardless of their need or desirability. The investment 
also means that less money is available in the county budget, thus impacting the county’s 
ability to borrow in order to finance alternative projects that may generate more positive 
impacts on the lives of ordinary citizens.  
 In addition, subsidizing entertainment projects like the American Airlines Arena 
may heighten cleavages between supporters and opponents of the project and erode trust 
between policy makers, civic leaders and local residents. Subsidies for professional sports 
facilities have not been popular among urban electorates judging by the political 
scorecard. Of the thirty referenda on stadium subsidies between 1984 and 1997, nineteen 
produced negative votes in 14 different cases (Eisinger, 2000, p. 324). However, the 
majority of defeated stadium subsidy proposals were subsequently approved through 
measures that circumvented voter approval, in many cases by creating special taxing 
districts to provide infrastructure investments. In Miami secrecy and evasion of public 
input has been the norm. Reporters have noted the proliferation of “pocket items” and 
other informal arrangements for approving the use of public funds (Jimenez, 2000). The 
decision to subsidize the AAA was similarly one made in secrecy, at an early morning 
emergency meeting while citizens were sleeping and in subsequent conversations 
between local elites in the luxury skyboxes of the old arena (Foreman, 2003, Dade 
County BOCC, 1996). As critical journalists expose the undemocratic nature of such 
decisions (Bernstein, 2001; DeFede, 1996; Jimenez, 2000; Nielsen, 2001), local 
stakeholders may feel increasingly alienated from the civic and political leaders that were 
responsible for the subsidy.  
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 Local residents and/or community organizations may feel cheated if the AAA 
project does not produce the new jobs promised by the arena subsidy proponents. The 
AAA initially staffed its food concessions with volunteers from community service 
organizations, preventing local residents or labor union members from occupying the jobs 
created at the AAA (Bridges, 1999). While this strategy failed after a short period due to 
the unreliability of volunteer workers, it sparked a conflict between the Arena manager 
and Hotel Employees Restaurant Employees (HERE) local 355, which charged BPL with 
breaking its promise to hire local residents (Stieghorst, 1999). Organizers from the union 
claimed that the AAA had created only 83 of the 900 jobs promised to participants in the 
city’s Workforce Development program. Moreover, dozens of HERE workers at the 
Heat’s former home, the Miami Arena, lost their jobs when the team relocated to the 
AAA, where the team allegedly pressured Levy Restaurants, manager of the facility’s 
food concessions, to avoid union representation.37 Although the AAA subsidy received 
greater support from non-white communities, such as Overtown, the subsequent attempts 
to avoid hiring local workers from the Miami Arena by using volunteer staff may have 
heightened cleavages between the community and AAA subsidy proponents.  
Moreover, the social contradictions inherent in the AAA subsidy surely remind 
the socio-economically marginalized populations of the county of the value of their 
community to local policy makers. In particular, the abandonment of the Miami Arena at 
the convenience of local elites is not unlike the zoning and transportation policies that 
                                                     
37 According to Andy Balash, labor organizer at HERE local 355, Levy Restaurants is a union-friendly 
company in most other states where they operate but he believes that the Miami Heat franchise pressured 
the food concessions management company to keep out the union using subtle threats to replace them. 
Balash indicated that his local made a strategic decision to avoid organizing the AAA workers since HERE 
has good relations with Levy Restaurants in other parts of the country.   
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facilitated the steep decline of the Overtown community during urban renewal and 
onward (Dhuly, Revell and Wong, 2002). Both the Miami Arena’s abandonment and the 
construction of Interstate 95 and other infrastructure projects exemplify the trend toward 
building cities to facilitate the spending of the visitor class (Eisinger, 2000, 1988). The 
recent trajectory of economic development in Miami appears to be a different version of 
urban renewal. Rather than directly leveling entire communities local officials provide a 
number of investment incentives and let the market crystallize developer interest and 
usher in socio-economic turnover in communities. Local activist groups have become 
increasingly vocal in their opposition to government supported gentrification. While it is 
difficult to precisely measure the extent to which the AAA led to strained relations 
between citizens and leaders, the conflicts over local hiring and the abandonment of the 
Miami Arena may have alienated the workers, labor groups and others in the central city 
neighborhoods that initially supported the project. Future research should consider the 
extent to which the AAA’s construction and operation generated enduring resentment 
among local residents and workers, community organizations or other stakeholders.  
 
 
Policy Implications.  
 At the policy level, there are a several options for regulating subsidies for 
professional sports facilities which involve fundamental reforms of the professional 
sports industry and processes of urban governance. Policies that shape the structure of 
professional sports can be changed, as well as policies related to urban economic 
development in the United States. The following discussion reviews the various policy 
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options that can be used to protect the public’s interest from the interests of stadium 
subsidy proponents.  
 
Sports Industry Reforms.  
Cities can regulate the amount of subsidy that can be provided to facilitate the 
construction or renovation of sports facilities for teams threatening to relocate. Although 
European countries subsidized sports as recently as the 1970’s, the European and United 
States “sports models” have diverged more recently (Andreff and Staudohar, 2000). In 
European football (soccer), for example, with the exception of Spain, the use of public 
subsidies to build new facilities or enhance the fortunes of the local team was banned in 
different countries (e.g., Germany, France, Italy) at different points throughout the 1980’s 
(Andreff and Staudohar, 2000; Baade, 2003). Outrageous subsidies in Spanish football 
persist not because teams demand it but rather because of the historical, cultural context 
of the connection between sports and politics in Spain (Levit, 2002).38 A couple of clubs 
in Italy have also recently received public support, but they remain the exception to the 
rule and such arrangements have mostly had negative political outcomes for the elites and 
policy makers involved.39 By contrast, several American policy makers have been 
reelected apparently without regard to their role in subsidizing stadiums for new or 
existing sports franchises (Brown, 2002; Eisinger, 2000).   
                                                     
38 Spanish politicians’ popularity seems to be strongly associated with the success of the teams they support 
publicly (and privately).  
 
39 Public support is perhaps not the most accurate description of the case in Italy. In one well known case, 
the country’s Prime Minister and owner of the AC Milan football club was forced to resign on two separate 
occasions amid accusations of corruption partly related to his involvement in the sports business.  
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The situation in Europe may in part reflect the priorities of policy makers and 
citizens (Levit, 2002), but it is more likely due to the fact that football is uncontested as 
the most popular sport in most of Europe (Andreff and Staudohar, 2000; Baade, 2003). 
The preeminence of a single sport protects the financial position of individual football 
clubs “by mitigating some of the financial risk assumed by teams by eliminating some 
competition for spectator interest and revenue” (Baade, 2003, p. 586). Thus, clubs are 
assured to capture most if not all of local residents spending on sports entertainment. By 
contrast, in the United States, the beginning of baseball season overlaps with basketball 
in the spring and the end of baseball overlaps with football in the fall, while football 
overlaps with hockey in the winter. Fans have many more “major league” sports 
consumption options. This does not suggest that in Europe other sports like basketball, 
cycling or tennis, to name a few, are not important; but they do not command such a wide 
audience the way European football or the aforementioned major league North American 
sports do.  
European apprehension to sports subsidies also reflects a more general emphasis 
in European football on sporting success as opposed to the greater prevalence of profit 
seeking that is evident in the United States (Andreff and Staudohar, 2000; Cairns, Jennett, 
and Sloane, 1986). In recent times there is no evidence of European clubs threatening to 
relocate or otherwise demanding new sports facilities to enhance profits. At the same 
time, European football is subject to the same forces that drive player salaries upward in 
the United States.  
The development of free agency in professional basketball in the United is a 
driving force behind the behavior of team owners to maximize profits through the 
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construction of new sports facilities (Andreff and Staudohar, 2000; Rosentraub, 1997). 
While free agency emerged in most U.S. sports leagues in the 1980’s and early 90’s, the 
1995 Bosman case in the European Court of Justice rescinded rules that regulated the 
ability of players to sell their talents on an international market for football (soccer) 
players. While this has similarly led to escalating player salaries in European football, 
there has not been a proliferation of publicly subsidized sports facilities. Like franchises 
in the U.S., European clubs have turned to advertising and merchandise sales on a global 
scale in order to generate the profits needed to afford top players. In particular, the United 
States’ consumer market has become the target of many top- and middle-tier European 
football clubs seeking to broaden their financial base (Andreff and Staudohar, 2000; Noll, 
2002). The same is occurring in the major sports leagues in the United States; 
professional football and basketball leagues have developed in Europe and other parts of 
the world while international competitions in basketball and hockey continue to grow in 
popularity (Fort, 2000). The U.S. National Basketball League (NBA), in particular, is 
experiencing an internationalization of its labor market in which foreign players are 
achieving unprecedented success with their NBA clubs and respective national teams in 
the Olympics. This has allowed North American basketball franchises to capture new 
revenue streams from the sale of team merchandise in previously untapped consumer 
markets around the world. However, while revenue from international sales represents a 
considerable boost to the bottom lines of European clubs, in the U.S. their potential to 
boost profits is undermined by revenue sharing policies in most leagues which seek to 
promote and preserve competitive balance. Indeed, while the top football competitions in 
Europe have traditionally been dominated by the top two or three clubs from the English, 
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Spanish, Italian and German leagues, in the U.S., particularly as of late, the historically 
wealthy teams do not necessarily come out on top.  
Thus, the U.S. sports model involves greater public sector involvement and 
promotes a more equitable distribution of championship potential while the European 
sports model revolves around the winning traditions of a select number of teams, albeit 
from several different countries.40  The apparent lack of competitive balance in Europe’s 
top leagues and tournaments is offset by the greater number of tournaments and trophies 
that are available. In particular, middle-tier teams in leagues may qualify for competitions 
from which most of the top clubs are absent, such as the UEFA Cup. In addition, at-large 
qualification allows little known teams from throughout Europe an opportunity to 
compete in any major tournament. Less wealthy teams are therefore able to showcase 
their talent on an international stage and bring pride to their local community. In addition 
to the “Champions League” and the UEFA Cup, which are international club 
competitions, football teams can win trophies in domestic leagues and tournaments, of 
which each country typically has several divisions. Moreover, the structure of European 
football leagues, in which poorly performing teams are relegated to lower divisions while 
the top two or three teams (depending on the league) are promoted, encourages teams to 
concentrate on winning. Being promoted to the highest division pays off by providing 
more national and international TV broadcast opportunities, enhancing the team’s ability 
to sell merchandise at home and abroad. But being relegated may also be beneficial if the 
                                                     
40 There are, of course, many instances of less wealthy or less known teams winning major competitions. 
However, in these cases the previously unknown talent in the team is usually lost by the following season 
to wealthy bidders. In Europe, the French and Dutch leagues, which have had several of such “surprise” 
teams in recent history, are considered major exporters of raw talent while clubs in the English, Spanish, 
German and Italian leagues are the major importers of new talent.  
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descending team’s quality enables it to win in the lower division and thereby increase 
attendance. By contrast, in the United States teams can only earn one trophy; league 
success leads to a “playoff” tournament which culminates in an inappropriately labeled 
“world championship” series or game. While more teams have the potential to be 
champions in the U.S., in Europe there a greater number of trophies to be won by teams 
at various levels of competitive ability.   
What does all of this have to do with the greater incidence of subsidies for 
professional sports facilities in the United States compared to Europe? First, in Europe, 
where almost every city and town has a local football club playing in one of the three or 
more football league divisions, teams cannot threaten to move to another city. Thus, the 
structure of European football does not provide team owners with the bargaining leverage 
that American franchise owners enjoy whenever they decide they want to build or 
renovate a sports facility with taxpayer dollars. Baade has also noted a “greater 
identification between communities and teams in Europe than is true in the United 
States” (Baade, 2003, p. 586). This is at least partly due to a difference in the culture of 
the European sports industry, which features a greater emphasis on winning, and longer, 
historical ties between teams and local communities in Europe (Andreff and Staudohar, 
2000; Baade, 2003). While most of Europe’s top football clubs and leagues were founded 
around 1900, most American sports leagues gained their present configuration mid-way 
through the 20th century and even the biggest franchises have changed cities and names 
several times since their inception. The difference in the sports models of the United 
States and Europe partially accounts for the differential incidence of subsidized sports 
facilities.  
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Banning direct and indirect public subsidies to sports teams in the United States is 
one reform that could be applied to protect taxpayers. This was already partly achieved 
through a 1999 law which prohibited the use of tax-exempt bonds to fund stadium 
construction (Baade, 2003). However, several other funding options remain that allow 
public officials to provide concessions in order to attract or retain sports teams. In 
addition, reforming the structure of American sports based on the European model would 
reduce the leverage of teams over cities, thereby reducing (or altogether eliminating) the 
concessions they receive through public-private partnerships. In particular, removing 
leagues’ ability to regulate the number of teams would allow for more teams in more 
cities and ultimately force leagues to adopt a divisional hierarchy, similar to European 
football, or competing sports leagues would develop to accommodate the greater number 
of teams. The development of rival leagues, for example, would ensure that if a team 
abandons a franchise-worthy city (that is, with large sports market) another league could 
place a team there to fill the void. Knowing this, cities would feel less compelled to grant 
concessions to retain a team threatening to leave. In turn, teams may be less likely to 
relocate or threaten to relocate, possibly leading to the development of deep and long-
term relationships between teams and cities such as is common in European football. The 
greater identification between teams and communities may also promote more 
responsible behavior toward local fans on the part of team owners and other local elites 
involved in the business of sports.  
Finally, it is important to note that in England, for example, it is not uncommon 
for stadiums to be shared by multiple teams, particularly in cities with more than one 
team playing in the “premier” league division like Manchester or Everton. Moreover, 
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many stadiums throughout Europe that host premier league or first division teams also 
serve teams in lower divisions. From the perspective of economic impacts, the before-
and-after match spending of fans that is induced by the presence of the team is multiplied 
by the presence of more than one team. Moreover, economic costs in the form of 
crowded out business and negative impacts from increased traffic is minimized by being 
isolated to a smaller area of the city.   
However, such reforms may not be feasible in the United States where there are 
four major sports compared to only one in Europe. Leagues and team owners control over 
the sports business is deeply entrenched and the government’s “hands-off” policy 
regarding sports may prove highly resistant to change (Andreff and Staudohar, 2000). But 
the sports industry is not the only relevant arena for policy reform.   
 
Urban Economic Development.  
Urban economic development processes are often informal and secretive and 
thereby unaccountable to interested publics. As mentioned earlier, Miami has been prone 
to a number of unaccountable legislative processes, including the negotiations that 
resulted in the AAA subsidy plan and the use of “pocket items” by a few policy makers 
(Bernstein, 2001; Nielsen, 2000). However, even where development decisions have 
greater transparency, they tend to favor the economic interests of investors in buying 
cheap (land) and selling high, the interests of public officials in boosting the local tax 
base through the enticement of upper-income homeowners and suburban or other visitors 
entertainment spending. These processes are usually carried out at the expense of existing 
residents who, in the case of inner city neighborhoods, are more economic and socially 
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vulnerable to change. Moreover, the interests of socio-economically distressed 
communities are less likely to be represented in urban planning processes and their 
concerns are more easily circumvented.  
Community-based groups in cities in California and subsequently in other parts of 
the country have recently developed a model for engaging communities in development 
processes that affect them. The community benefits movement is a model for political 
engagement in which communities control development projects through (1) disclosure 
requirements for each project, known as community impact reports (CIRs) and (2) 
community benefits agreements (CBAs), defined as a “legally enforceable contract, 
signed by community groups and by a developer, setting forth a range of community 
benefits that the developer agrees to provide as part of a development project” (Gross, 
2002, p. 1). CIRs require that developers and/or policy makers publicize information 
describing the impact a given project will have on a community. This typically includes 
detailed descriptions of the nature and scope of a project; sources of funding, including 
subsidies received; the anticipated impacts on local businesses, employment, traffic, and 
the environment; any benefits the project expects to provide for community residents; and 
a number of other disclosures. The CIR, which must be made part of the development 
process through legislative decree, is the foundation for the CBA negotiation process 
because it informs communities’ decisions regarding developments that impact them.  
Community Benefits Agreements (CBAs) may be a legally-binding contract 
between communities and developers (and possibly public agencies), but they are also an 
economic development process that affords communities’ leverage to negotiate the terms 
of development with private companies and/or policy makers. CBAs may be achieved on 
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a project-by-projects basis, when communities have built up enough political power over 
developers and/or policy makers through community organizing and activism or by law, 
if a community benefits ordinance is enacted (usually) following several project-specific 
negotiations. The CBA concept goes beyond the paper contract; it is a process involving 
(1) negotiation between developers and community stakeholders leading to the provision 
of community benefits and subsequent community support for a development project and 
(2) a mechanism to ensure that promises are kept through an agreed-upon practice for 
monitoring and enforcement the CBA’s conditions (Gross, 2002).  
While these are the desired outcomes in the community benefits model, they 
hinge on the achievement of political power through effective community organizing and 
the development of coalitions with other local, regional or national organizations that 
enhance the political clout of the neighborhood advocates. These are arguably the most 
important components of the community benefits model, for without political power 
developers and policy makers have no reason to concede to neighborhoods’ demands. A 
review of power-building in social movements is beyond the scope this thesis; suffice to 
say that scholarly analysts have written extensively about the factors that shape 
community-based power and the path to (desired) policy change or the failure and/or 
disintegration of social movements (Eisinger, 1973; Gamson, 1990; Jenkins and Parrow, 
1983; Lipsky, 1970; McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, 1996; Melucci, 1980; Morris, 1984; 
Snow and Benford, 1988; Swidler, 1986; Tarrow, 1983, 1989; Tilly, 1978).  
 In the case of the American Airlines Arena project, a well-organized community-
based movement in collaboration with arena subsidy plan opponents such as Dan Paul’s 
coalition of activists, may have been able to generate enough political pressure in an 
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election year to require that the project provide benefits to the community through job 
creation and targeted hiring policies, guarantees for minority-owned business 
participation beyond the initial construction phase (i.e., as tenants at or near the arena), 
monetary concessions and other benefits. Furthermore, greater public participation in the 
development process instead of secret negotiations between policy makers and 
developers may have strengthened relations between citizens and leaders, and generated 
greater support for the project and possibly higher attendance rates for the arena. In a 
more extreme scenario, a powerful community-based organization or coalition may have 
been able to freeze plans to build a publicly funded arena, such as has occurred in San 
Francisco and Los Angeles to a limited extent with other types of projects (e.g., “Big 
Box” retail stores).41  Regardless of the hypothetical outcome, transparency, public 
participation and enforced accountability are essential for ensuring an adequate return on 
the public’s investment in economic development projects.    
  
Conclusion.   
 The financial arrangements between the American Airlines Arena and Miami-
Dade County generate profits for the team while distributing net losses to the county and 
local taxpayers. If the arena has not been able to generate a sufficient non-local fan base 
then the revenue impact on the county is insignificant. The spending of Broward fans 
most likely represents a realignment of local entertainment spending rather than new 
spending. The available evidence (hotel staff testimony, overall attendance rates, and 
geographic context) suggests that the Miami Heat attract very few out-of-state (hotel-
                                                     
41 See LAANE (www.laane.org) and Good Jobs First (www.goodjobsfirst.org) for examples.  
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going) fans during the regular season, thus the vast majority of non-local spending is 
likely to be done by in-state fans from Palm Beach, and to a lesser extent the Florida 
Keys and other locations. Most of these fans commute home after basketball games and 
may prefer to patronize the familiar local venues of their home town, reducing the 
chances that they would spend time and money in the environs of the arena before and 
after a game. Insomuch as post-season (playoff) games are few, the overall impact of 
these is likely to be negligible. Moreover, it is difficult to predict such an impact given 
the complexity of factors that affect team performance. Finally, since the greater seating 
capacity of the new arena should not affect attendance at events that typically do not 
attract more than 15,000, these events do not attract more visitors than the Miami Arena 
and therefore do not import visitor spending. Thus, the AAA is thought to generate about 
$3.9 million in incremental sales and tax revenue, of which no more than $1.17 million is 
expended to create 63 new jobs in the local economy. Combined with fiscal losses of 
more than $200 million over 30 years, these findings suggest that from an economic 
standpoint, the costs of building and operating the AAA with public funds far outweigh 
the benefits that taxpayers receive.   
 The construction and operation of the American Airlines with assistance from 
taxpayer dollars was unjustified as an economic development subsidy. Government 
intervention in the sports market is unwarranted in the context of increasingly lucrative 
advertising, merchandising and luxury seating arrangements that make it plausible to 
finance professional sports facilities without public assistance. Moreover, in the case of 
the AAA project, the public’s investment in sports entertainment did not generate the 
positive economic impacts pledged by the proponents of the arena subsidy plan. While 
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the presence of the arena and the Miami Heat team may provide consumption benefits to 
basketball fans who attend games or view them on TV, this likely represents a minority 
of the county’s population and may be unequally distributed. Furthermore, the AAA’s 
negative economic impact and the lack and transparency and accountability in the process 
through which the subsidy plan was approved generate non-economic costs that may 
have strained relations between leaders and voters.  
Miami’s experience with building private sports facilities with public dollars fits 
into a national pattern in which team owners have sought public assistance to build more 
profitable facilities in the face of escalating player salaries and urban policy makers 
concede subsidies for fear of losing a professional sports team or failing to acquire one. 
Reforming the professional sports industry by allowing for a greater number of teams and 
leagues or league divisions and/or by removing professional sports exemption from 
antitrust regulation would make cities less vulnerable to the demands of profiteering team 
owners. In addition, communities in which publicly financed sports facilities are planned 
for development can get organized and mobilize in opposition to such plans and demand 
community impact reports and community benefits agreements from developers and/or 
policy makers. While such changes are not without significant obstacles, steps toward 
these reforms are necessary to protect the interests of taxpayers when professional sports 
teams seek taxpayer dollars to reap greater profits from new sports facilities.  
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APPENDIX 
Fiscal Return on the Public’s Investment 
Table 7 presents a more comprehensive consideration of the various public 
subsidies and returns from the AAA. Figures included here that were excluded in 
estimate of net fiscal return in chapter V include foregone property taxes and outstanding 
debt on the Miami Arena. The former arena is included in the subsidy total since the 
construction of the AAA (and Broward’s Office Depot Center) and the departure of it’s 
two professional teams converted it from a profitable public investment to a fiscal burden 
(until  it was sold last year). Foregone property taxes are included since in traditional 
public-private partnerships formed for the purpose of economic development the 
developable land is sold to the private company.  
In addition, the figures in table 7 consider both geographic definition of the non-
local fan base and a more optimistic projection of the county’s share of arena profits. The 
most likely scenario is that the arena will not earn net income above $14 million in any 
year over the next 30 years.42 However, assuming an optimistic increase in the number of 
tenants and retail fees, revenue from non-basketball events and considerable cutbacks in 
payroll and other expenses, the county could receive up to $32 million through its 
revenue sharing agreement with the arena. Despite the various adjustments, the net losses 
from the public’s investment in the AAA continue to exceed $200 million.    
 
 
                                                     
42 The chances of this are reinforced by the fact that American Airlines recently renegotiated its purchase of 
the arena naming rights in order to cut costs, although the outcome was not reported (South Florida 
Business Journal, 2003). Revenue from the sale of the arena naming rights represents a relatively large 
portion of the arena’s annual intake (BPL Audit Reports, 2000-2004).   
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Table 6. Fiscal Costs and Benefits to Miami-Dade County  
 Subsidy and Revenue Sources 30 Year Total 
 Operating And Services Subsidy  $ (196,900,000)
 Land Subsidy  $   (42,000,000)
 Roadways Investment  $     (1,800,000)
 MDC Parking Garage (1998)  $   (28,000,000)
Foregone Property Taxes  $   (18,734,770)
 Miami Arena Outstanding Debt  $   (24,000,000)
Total Subsidy  $ (311,434,770)
Direct Naming Rights Surplus  $      2,000,000 
 Park Fund  $         500,000 
 County Share  $    32,000,000 
 Local Sales Tax Revenue (CMSA, 20% non-locals)  $      8,401,830 
 Local Sales Tax Revenue (CMSA, 50% non-locals)  $    14,968,041 
 Retail Fees  $      6,000,000 
 Revenue From Parking  $      8,642,799 
i. Least Optimistic Return Calculation  $    25,544,629 
ii. Total Return (CMSA-based visitor spending)  $    57,544,629 
iii. Total Return (MSA-based visitor spending)  $    64,110,840 
Cost/Benefit to Public (i)  $ (285,890,141)
Cost/Benefit to Public (ii)  $ (253,890,141)
Cost/Benefit to Public (iii) $ (247,323,930)
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